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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE FINDINGS-
CROWELL v. BENSON
THE Supreme Court of the United States has, more than once,
made an insignificant controversy between unknown parties the
occasion for the determination of major constitutional issues
affecting larger interests of a different order. And it has, more
than once, for fear of a gale, shut tight the door of unconstitu-
tionality to even a refreshing breeze. Of such practice Crowell
v. Benson,' decided at the present term of Court, is another in-
stance.
One Knudsen was accidentally injured while he was splicing a
cable on a derrick barge owned by Benson and moored in the
Mobile River. His claim for compensation under the Federal
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act 2 came
152 Sup. Ct. 285. (1932). For comment on the case below see (1929)
43 HARv. L. RBV. 131; (1931) 40 YALE L. J. 985.
2 March 4, 1927, c. 509, 44 STAT. 1424, 33 U. S. C., §§ 901-950. Section
903, entitled "Coverage," provides:
"(a) Compensation shall be payable under this chapter in respect of
[1037]
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on for hearing before a Deputy Commissioner of the United
States Employees' Compensation Commission. 3 Benson (or his
insurance carrier) resisted the claim on the ground that Knud-
sen "was not at the time of his injury an employee of" Benson.
The evidence introduced before the Commissioner, occupying
78 pages of the printed record, "was directed largely to that
issue and was conflicting." 4 The deputy commissioner found
for the claimant and awarded him compensation. In a suit to
enjoin enforcement of the award, pursuant to Section 21 (b)
of the Act,5 Benson repeated the defense urged before the Com-
disability or death of an employee, but only if the disability or death results
from an injury occurring upon the navigable waters of the United States
(including any dry dock) and if recovery for the disability or death through
workmen's compensation proceedings may not validly be provided by State
law. No compensation shall be payable in respect of the disability or death
of (1) a master or member of a crew of any vessel, nor any person engaged
by the master to load or unload or repair any small vessel under eighteen
tons net; or (2) an officer or employee of the United States . . . or of any
State or foreign government ... (b) No compensation shall be payable if
the injury was occasioned solely by the intoxication of the employee or by
[his] willful intention . .. to injure or kill himself or another."
Section 904 provides that "every employer shall be liable for and secure
payment to his employees of the compensation payable under" the Act. In
§ 902, "Definitions," "injury" is defined as "accidental injury or death
arising out of and in the course of employment," and occupational diseases
arising "naturally" out of the employment or resulting from the "acci-
dental injury;" and "employer" is defined as "an employer, any of whose
employees are employed in maritime employment, in whole or in part, upon
the navigable waters of the United States."
3 This Commission was in existence when the Longshoremen's Act was
passed and it was charged with the duty of administering compensation to
civil employees of the Government. Instead of creating a new tribunal the
Congress entrusted to this existing commission the administration of that
Act, as it did also with the District of Columbia Compensation Act passed
in 1928.
The Longshoremen's Act directed the Commission to divide the United
States into "compensation districts" and to "assign to each such district
one or more deputy commissioners, as the commission deems advisable."
(§ 939 (b) ). The Commission was authorized to appoint deputy com-
missioners, "subject to the provisions of the civil service laws," and to fix
their salaries "in accordance with" the provisions of The Classification Act
of 1923, 42 STAT. 1488, 5 U. S. C. § 661 et seq. (§ 939 (a) ).
The Commission was also authorized to appoint "any member of any
board, commission, or other agency of a State to act as deputy commis-
sioner for any compensation district or part thereof in such State" and to
"make arrangements with such board, commission, or other agency for the
use of the personnel and facilities thereof in the administration" of the
Act. (§ 940)-an exemplary and quite unusual provision for State and
Federal cooperation which contains limitless possibilities for economy,
efficiency, and cordiality in political relations.
4 52 Sup. Ct. at 298, per Brandeis, J.
5 33 U. S. C. § 921. Subdivision (a) provides that "unless proceedings
for the suspension or setting aside of such order are instituted as provided
1038 [Vol. ,t1
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missioner. The latter moved to dismiss the bill on the ground
that the court was precluded by the Act from reviewing his
findings on that issue in the absence of a showing that there
was no evidence in the record before him to support them.
The District Court wrote two opinions,, filled with generalities,
and long quotations from miscellaneous cases as to "due process,"
"judicial determinations," and "the judicial power." It con-
cluded, however, that the Act must be interpreted as giving
"to the admiralty courts 7 the power to hear and determine the
facts as well as the law," s since, otherwise, the Act would vio-
late the due process clause and Article III of the Constitution.9
It apparently meant to extend this conclusion to all questions
of fact or law. If it meant something more limited, it did not
make any effort to say so.9a Acting on its conclusion, the court
granted a trial de ?wvo on "the facts and the law." It refused
even to read the record before the Commissioner,,, and on the
basis of the fresh evidence introduced before it, found that
Knudsen was not an employee of Benson at the time of the
in subdivision (b) of this section," the deputy commissioner's compensation
order "shall become final at the expiration of the thirtieth day" after it is
filed in his office. Subdivision (b) provides: "If not in accordance with
law, a compensation order may be suspended or set aside, in whole or in
part, through injunction proceedings, mandatory or otherwise, brought by
any party in interest against the deputy commissioner making the order,
and instituted in the Federal district court for the judicial district in which
the injury occurred....!
Section 19 (a), 33 U. S. C. § 919 (a) fixes the time within which com-
pensation claims shall be filed and provides that "the deputy commissioner
shall have full power and authority to hear and determine all questions
in respect of such claim."
633 F. (2d) 137 (S. D. Ala. 1929); 38 F. (2d) 306 (S. D. Ala. 1930).
7 The court held that since the Act deals with maritime injuries, pro-
ceedings to enjoin enforcement of awards thereunder must be brought in
admiralty.
833 F. (2d) 137, 141-2.
9"Article III, § 1. The judicial power of the United States shall be
vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress
may from time to time ordain and establish .... § 2. The judicial power
shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution,
the laws of the United States ... ; to all cases of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction."
sa In L'Hote v. Crowell, a District Court in the same circuit granted a
trial de novo to review the question whether a claimant for compensation
was a dependent of the injured employee and set aside the Deputy Com-
missioner's finding. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed 54 F. (2d) 212
(C. C. A. 5th, 1931). In a per curiam order the Supreme Court reversed on
the ground that the Commissioner's finding on that issue was not review-
able. U. S. Daily, April 26, 1932, at 370.
1o "The decree contained the recital that 'the respondent Crowell pro-
duced, offered and filed in evidence the record of the proceedings before
him as Deputy Commissioner, but did not read the same to the Court, nor
did the Court read it." 45 F. (2d) 66, 67 (C. C. A. 5th, 1930).
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injury and enjoined enforcement of the award.1 The Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the decree.1 2
The Supreme Court granted certiorari not "to review the par-
ticular facts but to pass upon the question of principle." 13 To
three 14 of the eight 's Justices who participated in the decision
this "question of principle" was simply "Upon what record shall
the district court's review of the order of the deputy commis-
sioner be based?"; and they voted to reverse and remand the
case on the ground that the review should have been based on
the record before the commissioner because Congress did not
11 Although there are five reported opinions in this case, the exact facts
nowhere appear. It nowhere appears what is meant by the statement that
Knudsen was not an employee of Benson "at the time of the injury,"
Doubtless he was not a total stranger. In the absence of a perusal of the
record, several possibilities may be advanced: that he was an "independ-
ent contractor;" that he was performing the service gratuitously; that he
was a regular employee of Benson but was performing the particular serv-
ice on his own time gratuitously; that the service was not in the line of
his employment; that he was employed to commence work after the time
of his iijury; that his employment terminated prior to the injury.
'
2 Suprd note 10. The reasoning of the Circuit Court of Appeals was
largely similar to that of the District Court. It did, however, state two
grounds not mentioned below. First, the Act provides that "In making an
investigation or inquiry or conducting a hearing the deputy commissioner
shall not be bound by common law or statutory rules of evidence or by
technical or formal rules of procedure, except as provided by this chapter;
but may make such investigation or inquiry or conduct such hearing in
such manner as to best ascertain the rights of the parties." (§ 23 (a), 33
U. S. C. § 923 (a).) Consequently, thought the Court, the Commissioner
could base his findings on facts found in an ex parte investigation without
giving the parties an opportunity to disprove them. Second, the disputed
facts in the instant case were "jurisdictional" and determinative of the
Commissioner's "right or power to act at all." The first ground is applic-
able, of course, to findings by the Commissioner on any facts. And, while
the second ground may be taken as a limitation of the decision to findings
on "jurisdictional" facts only, it does not seem to have been so intended by
the Court. It seems, rather, to be stated as an a fortiori reason for the
soundness of the decision, "especially" as to such facts. The second ground
is discussed herbinafter. The first ground was later stated by the Supreme
Court to be plainly erroneous. 52 Sup. Ct. at 291. The Act requires the
Commissioner, when requested, to hold hearings and to have the evidence
at the hearings recorded. §§ 19 (c) and 23 (b), 33 U. S. C. §§ 919 (c) and
923 (b). Regulations and instructions of the Commission for deputy com-
missioners also make these requirements.
13 52 Sup. Ct. at 298. The method and scope of review under the Long-
shoremen's Act were passed upon by several Circuit Courts of Appeal and
District Courts in suits to enjoin enforcement of awards of Deputy Com-
missioners. While the questions sought to be reviewed varied from those in
the Crowell case, the decisions of the District and Circuit Courts were
mutually regarded as conflicting with the decisions of the other courts.
14 Mr. Justice Brandeis, Mr. Justice Stone and Mr. Justice Roberts. Their
opinion was written by Mr. Justice Brandeis.
isMr. Justice Cardozo was not then on the Bench.
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authorize and the Constitution did not compel a trial de noro.
The remaining five justices undertook to pass upon the validity
of the Act "in relation to (1) its provisions defining substantive
rights and (2) its procedural requirements." On the first phase,
they experienced little difficulty.17 With respect to the second
phase, they had "no doubt" that apart from cases involving con-
stitutional rights the Act contemplates that on facts relating to
"the circumstances, nature, extent and consequences of the em-
ployee's injuries," the Commissioner's finding shall be final, if
supported by evidence. For the "efficacy of the plan" and "pur-
pose" embodied in the Act "depend" upon that. But since the
Act does not expressly preclude the court, in proceedings to set
aside an award, from making "its own examination and determi-
nation of facts whenever that is deemed necessary to enforce a
constitutional right properly asserted, and since such a prohibi-
tion would be invalid under the doctrine of the Ben Avon ' case,
16 The Court opinion was written by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes.
" The power of Congress to deal with the subject matter at all was
found in its power to "alter or revise" the maritime law, a power which the
Court had previously found in the provision of Article III that "the judicial
power shall extend ...to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdic-
tion.. . ." See Washington v. Dawson & Co., 264 U. S. 219, 44 Sup. Ct.
302 (1924). Three grounds were stated for the validity of the substantive
provisions enacted: (1) "In view of the difficulties which inhere in the
ascertainment of actual damages, the Congress was entitled to provide for
the payment of amounts which would approximate the probable damages;"
(2) "liability without fault is not unknown to the maritime law;" and (3)
"considerations are applicable, . .. with respect to the relation of master
and servant, similar to those" which have been held sufficient to sustain
workmen's compensation laws of the States against attack under the
Fourteenth Amendment.
'Is Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U. S. 287, 40 Sup.
Ct. 527 (1920). The case concerned an attack by the water company upon
an order of a state commission fixing water rates. It was alleged that the
rate was confiscatory because of errors in the valuation of the plant. The
attack was made in the State courts on appeal from the commission pur-
suant to the State practice. The State Supreme Court found that there
was evidence in the record before the Commission to sustain its finding of
value, and that the State courts had no power, in appeals from the Com-
mission, to weigh the evidence and reverse the findings if not in accord
with their opinion as to the weight of the evidence. This decision was
reversed by the Supreme Court of the United States. Holding that the
issue of confiscation could not be dissociated from the questions of fact
as to the value of the plant, the Court stated that the utility was entitled
to "a fair opportunity for submitting that issue to a judicial tribunal for
determination upon its own independent judgment as to both law and
facts," and that a statute prescribing a more limited judicial review would
be repugnant to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It
was not questioned, however, that the judicial review could validly be
limited to the evidence before the Commission. The case excited an unusual
amount of comment, references to which are collected in footnote 27 of the
dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis in Crowell v. Benson.
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"no such limitation is to be implied." The Court thus easily
avoided the due process attack on the "procedural requirements."
With the contention based on Article III, the Court experienced
greater difficulty. It postulated that, since the Act relates to
"cases of private right,... of the liability of one individual to
another," the procedure for their determination is not "com-
pletely within Congressional control." "0 They must be tried,
apparently, in "constitutional courts"-courts created pursuant
to Article III. "There is no requirement," however, "that, in
order to maintain the essential attributes of the judicial power, all
determinations in constitutional courts shall be made by judges."
As to the facts bearing on "the circumstances, nature, extent and
consequences of the injury," Article III does not preclude ad-
ministrative finality. But "the appropriate maintenance of fed-
eral judicial power in requiring the observance of constitutional
restrictions" does preclude Congress from substituting "for con-
stitutional courts ..... an administrative agency .... for the
final determination of the existence of the facts upon which
the enforcement of the constitutional rights of the citizen de-
pend." On facts which are "fundamental" or "jurisdictional"
"in the sense that their existence is a condition precedent to
the operation of the statutory scheme," the findings of the admin-
istrative body cannot be made final. To hold otherwise, "would
be to sap the judicial power as it exists under the Federal Con-
stitution, and to establish a government of a bureaucratic char-
acter alien to our system, wherever fundamental rights depend
. . . upon the facts, and finality as to facts becomes in effect
finality in law." 20
29 An "at once apparent" distinction was drawn between "cases of private
right and those which arise between the Government and persons subject
to its authority in connection with the performance of the constitutional
functions of the executive or legislative departments." And it was stated
that "the mode of determining matters" of the latter class "is completely
within Congressional control." But the distinction was later obfuscated by
the statement: "Even where the subject lies within the general authority
of the Congress, the propriety of a challenge by judicial proceedings of
the determinations of fact deemed to be jurisdictional as underlying the
authority of executive officers, has been recognized." The relevancy of the
attempted distinction, in view of the later modification, is not clear. The
dissenting Justices apparently took it as a "suggestion that due process
does not require judicial process in any controversy to which the govern-
ment is a party." Such a suggestion, they said, "would involve a revision
of historic conceptions of the nature of the federal judicial system." 62
Sup. Ct. at footnote 53.
20 In making this discrimination between "jurisdictional" and other facts,
the Court, obviously, was not interpreting "plainly" the "plain language"
of the Constitution. To bolster its conclusion that not all determinations in
"constitutional courts" must be made by judges, the Court cited analogles.
The "Constitution itself" requires the aid of juries on the law side of the
federal courts and it is "historic practice" for those courts sitting in equity
[Vol. 411042
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Two questions under the Longshoremen's Act are "fundamen-
tal" and "jurisdictional" (1) Whether the claimant is an em-
ployee of the person from whom he seeks compensation (2)
Whether the injury took place on navigable waters. Affirmative
findings on these questions are "indispensable" conditions to the
application of the statute, "not only because Congress has so
provided explicitly (Sec. 3), but also because the power of Con-
gress to enact the legislation turns upon the existence of these
conditions." So, in order to sustain the Act rather than defeat
it, it must be interpreted as providing, in compliance with Article
III, that these "fundamental" facts be determined independently
by the federal courts.2 1 But Article III requires more. In order
or admiralty to call to their assistance, "without the consent of the parties"
masters, commissioners or assessors "to pass upon certain classes of ques-
tions." And while their reports "are essentially of an advisory nature, it has
not been the practice to disturb their findings when they are properly
based upon evidence ...and the parties have no right to demand that the
court shall redetermine the facts thus found." "Judged by the substance
of what is required" rather than by "mere matters of form," the difference
between these "historic" fact-finders and the deputy commissieners was
not so great as to render invalid provisions for the finality of determina-
tions of the latter. The analogy is surely persuasive. But when the Court
reached the discussion of jurisdictional facts, the analogy seemed to lose
its persuasiveness. The Court then pointed out that "even where issues of
fact are tried by juries in the Federal courts, such trials are under the
constant superintendence of the trial judge" who is "empowered to instruct
them on the law and to advise them on the facts, and ...to set aside
their verdict if in his opinion it is against the law or the evidence ....
,And . . .masters in chancery and commissioners in admiralty ... are
always subject to the direction of the court and their reports are essen-
tially advisory." All this is equally true, however, in regard to facts not
"jurisdictional.' It certainly is not established dogma that the determina-
tions of juries, masters and commissioners are given less weight when
they relate to "jurisdictional" facts than when they relate to other facts.
21 The District Court, the Circuit Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court each "interpreted" the Act as providing for their respective con-
clusions. Were their interpretations really to be found in the language of
the Act, the extended discussions of the constitutional issues would have
been as irrelevant as they are dangerous. But the language of the Act
does not lend itself to the interpretations made. Consequenty all thrce
courts concurred in finding that the Constitution-not the Act-requircd
their respective interpretations. They were thus able to avoid holding a
part of the statute unconstitutional. The process by which the conclusion
was reached that the Act could be interpreted so as to avoid unconstitu-
tionality is enlightening. The District Court, which started with the con-
clusion that all facts are to be reviewable in a trial de noro, had easy
sledding: The Act provides that an award is to be set aside if not "in
accordance with law." An award cannot be "in accordance with law" if
the facts of the case are such as not to "justify" an award under the Act.
Consequently before the court can decide whether or not to set aside the
award, it must kmow the facts. "If the evidence offered before the court"
shows that the facts are such as not to "justify" the award, it is not "in
accordance with law." Easy sledding, indeed, since the court missed the
1932] 1043
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to preserve "the essential independence of the exercise of the
judicial power of the United States in the enforcment of consti-
tutional rights," it requires that "the Federal court should deter-
mine such" issues "upon its own record and the facts elicited
real issues. Results in litigation, as in other human activities, do not de-
pend upon "the absolute existence in reality of any fact" (Brandeis, J. 52
Sup. Ct. at 306), but upon someone's determination or guess in relation
thereto. And the real issues in this case are not what are the "true" facts,
but rather: (1) Who shall have the power to make that determination:
whose guess shall end the dispute as to the facts? (2) How many oppor-
tunities shall the parties have to present evidence upon which the determi-
nation is to be made?
The Circuit Court of Appeals, which also concluded, apparently, that all
questions of fact are reviewable on a trial do novo, also had easy sledding.
It saw in the Act nothing to indicate "what is to be considered by the court
in passing on [the] question" where the award is in accordance with law,
"nothing . . . to indicate that anything done or said by or before the
Deputy Commissiofier, other than his order . . . is required to be dis-
closed or made known to the court in any way." "The remedy provided
for, an injunction, usually is a process issuing, from a court of first instance,
whose action in awarding such process is based on evidence adduced before
itself, and its own findings or conclusions from that evidence." (45 F. (2d)
at 68-9.) The court, apparently, looked intently at the words in the statute
and shut out the clear light that might be shed on the meaning of sections
19 (a) and 21 (b), supra note 5, by the purpose of the Act, by the practical
requirements for the effectuation of that purpose and by the interpretation
given to similar language in other statutes.
The Supreme Court, of necessity, had to find a different basis for its
"interpretation." For, its conclusion was to be that some findings of the
deputy commissioner are final, while his findings are "jurisdictional" facts
are reviewable on a trial do novo in the District Court. To this end, the
Court reasoned that the finality of determinations of the deputy commis-
sioner "is predicated primarily upon the provision (§ 19 (a) ) that he
'shall have full power and authority to hear and determine all questions
in respect of such claim.' But 'such claim' is the claim for compensation
under the Act and by its explicit provisions is that of an 'employee,' as
defined by the Act, against his 'employer.' . . . In the absence of any pro-
vision as to the finality of the determination by the deputy commissioner
of the jurisdictional fact of employment, the statute is open to the con-
struction that the court in determining whether a compensation order is in
accordance with law may determine the fact of employment which under.
lies the operation of the statute. And, to remove the question as to validity,
[which the Court had already passed upon] we think that the statute
should be so construed." (52 Sup. Ct. at 297.)
Thus does section 19 (a), supra note 5, require finality for some findings
but not for others. When the Supreme Court says that "such claim" means
a claim which satisfies the requirements of employment and injury on
navigable waters, then, of course, that is what it means. But before the
court spoke, that meaning could hardly have occurred to one. Section 19
(a) comprises one sentence. It provides that "a claim for compensation
may be filed" seven days after disability following an injury "and the
deputy commissioner shall have full power and authority to hear and
determine all questions in respect of such claim." Before the Court spoke,
one would have supposed that "such claim" refers to the claim that is
filed,-the claim which Knudsen filed in the instant case.
1044 [Vol. 41
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before it." The District Court "did not err," therefore in dis-
regarding the record before the Commissioner and "permitting
a trial de novo on the issue of employment"; and, since certiorari
was not granted to review the particular facts, the decree below
was affirmed when the questions "of principle" were thus set-
tled.-22
22 Six weeks prior to this decision, the Court announced its decision in
Dahlstrom Metallic Door Co. v. Industrial Board, 52 Sup. Ct. 202 (1932).
That case involved the validity of provisions in the New York Workmen's
Compensation Law that the findings of the Industrial Board "shall be final
as to all questions of fact" and appeal to the Appellate Division permitted on
"questions of law" only. The Court had previously held valid such provi-
sion in an elective compensation act solely on the ground that a party who
elected to come under it could not be heard to complain of its provisions.
Booth Fisheries Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 271 U. S. 208, 46
Sup. Ct. 491 (1926). But the New York Law is compulsory, and the validity
of such provisions in a compulsory act was presented to the Court for the
first time in the Dahlstrom case. A referee of the Industrial Board had
made a compensation award of $197.91 for a 45 per cent lass of use of the
right little finger and 12% per cent loss of use of the right ring finger.
On review of this award, the Industrial Board increased it to $395.41. The
Appellate Division affirmed the award with the statement that the "court
did not review the facts, except to ascertain that there was evidence to
sustain the finding, but accepted the decision of the Board as final in ac-
cordance with the provisions" of the Law. 231 App. Div. 775, 245 N. Y.
Supp. 802 (3d Dep't 1930); 232 App. Div. 710, 246 N. Y. Supp. 918 (3d
Dep't 1931). On appeal to the New York Court of Appeals it was urged
that the procedure thus applied was repugnant to the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment and that the Supreme Court's decision in the
Ben Avon Borough case (supra note 18) required an independent judicial
determination of questions of fact. That Court answered that the function
of administering workmen's compensation statutes is not of a kind with
that of public utility rate fixing, involved in the Ben Avon case; that the
procedure under the Compensation Law provides for notice, full hearing
and determination by an impartial tribunal; and that these features are
adequate guaranty of due process in the administration of a law of this
kind. When the same attack was made on appeal to the Supreme Court of
the United States, the Court replied: "PER CURIAM. As this case is
governed by principles set forth in New York Central Railroad Company v.
White, 243 U. S. 188,... and Mountain Timber Company v. Washington,
243 U. S. 219,... the judgment is affirmed." Neither the New York statute
nor the New York courts drew any distinctions between different kinds of
"questions of fact." To the Board's determinations regarding the existence
of an employment relation between the applicant for compensation and the
respondent, the Court of Appeals attributed no greater significance than
that accorded to the Board's findings as to the extent or cause of the injury.
Nor did it question the practice, general in the States, of limiting all review
of the Board's orders to the record before the Board. And the Supreme
Court was silent as to both features. In both cases cited in the per uriam
order, the attack was directed against the substantive provisions, the general
scheme of workmen's compensation, the liability imposed by the statutes.
In neither case was question raised as to the scope of judicial review and




On the question of administrative finality, the decision is not
merely an extension of the Ben Avon doctrine to the review of
findings of other administrative tribunals. For, by the ninth
page 23 of its opinion, the Court concluded that the due process
clause and the Ben Avon case require an interpretation of the
Longshoremen's Act under which the courts would have to make
an independent "examination and determination of facts when-
ever that is deemed necessary to enforce a constitutional right
properly asserted." It then proceeds to state, in some twelve
pages, that Article III makes the same requirement as to such
facts and as to facts deemed to be "fundamental" or "jurisdic-
tional." The two categories overlap, but seem not to be coinci-
dent. "Jurisdictional facts," "in relation to administrative
agencies, are defined in a footnote as facts which determine
whether "a given case" "falls within the scope of the authority
validly conferred." 24 Apparently, certain facts may be "juris-
dictional" within the requirement of Article III if they are
regarded as "underlying the authority" conferred by the Con-
gress on administrative agencies, even though the Congress could,
constitutionally, confer a greater authority which would not be
thus dependent on such facts. The compulsion of Article III,
then, seems to be exerted on a considerably larger class of cases
than that of the due process clause. It may be that the Court's
extension to administrative tribunals generally of the Ben Avon
doctrine requiring a judicial determination of facts involving
"constitutional rights" is also applicable to the review by State
courts of orders of State administrative tribunals; for the Court
talks about the Fourteenthand Fifth Amendments as containing
the same restrictions in this connection. 25 But to the extent that
"jurisdictional facts" do not involve "constitutional rights," the
decision does not require that scope of review in state courts for
administrative findings of state tribunals. Similarly, the require-
ment of a trial de novo on a new record-the principal issue
upon which the Court divided and to which the majority opinion
devotes only one page out of 24-is based entirely on interpola-
tions in Article III and is not applicable to proceedings in state
courts.
While the states differ in the practice as to the scope and mode
of judicial review of administrative findings, they very generally
deny the right to a trial de noVo. 2G But "state statutes and cita-
23 The page reference is to the official advance sheets of the individual
opinions.
24 52 Sup. Ct. at 294, footnote 17.
25 It seems highly improbable, however, in view of the unqualified affirm-
ance in the Dahlstrom case, supra note 22, that the Court will require tho
issue of "employment" under State Compensation Acts to be reviewed by
State courts in the same manner as under the Federal Act.
26 See cases collected in the opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis, 62 Sup. Ct.
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tions from state courts" sanctioning this uniform practice were
dismissed by the majority as irrelevant. For they deal with the
"distribution of state powers," while the instant case deals with
the distribution of federal powers. The federal "separation of
powers" doctrine places no restriction on the states. "A state
may distribute its powers as it sees fit, provided only that" it
does not violate the due process clause or other "restrictions
applicable to state authority." 27 And yet the state constitutions
uniformly prescribe a "separation of powers" in the state gov-
ernments,-many in terms much more stringent and explicit than
those found in the Federal Constitution.28 The State constitu-
tions seem to be as deeply concerned with the independence of
the State judicial power as is the Federal Constitution with that
of the Federal judicial power. "Government of a bureaucratic
character" is as "alien" to the state constitutions as it is to the
Federal. Are not the state citations, then, at least "persuasive
authority," as interpretations of similar constitutional restric-
tions in similar governmental systems? 20
Crowell v. Benson injects into the administration of the Long-
shoremen's Act inconvenience and confusion which will mate-
rially obstruct attainment of its ends. Despite the Court's state-
ment that the "fundamental, jurisdictional facts" to which the
decision is applicable relate to the two questions of place of injury
and employment, it will take many years and a host of decisions
to define those terms specifically.30 The logic of the Court's opin-
at 299, footnote 35; Lilienthal, The Federal Cou.rts and State Rcgulation of
Public Utilities (1930) 43 HARv. L. REV. 379, 412-13; Hearings on S. 3243,
Committee on the Judiciary, U. S. Senate, 72nd Cong., 1st Zess., March 18
and 19, 1932 at 127-137.
2752 Sup. Ct. at 295.
28 See compilation and analysis in FPANKFURTER AND DAvIsox, CAszs o
ADMINISTR.iTiE LAW (1932) 1149.
29 In the interpretation of provisions in State constitutions, State courts
frequently rely upon the Supreme Court's interpretation of similar provi-
sions in the Federal Constitution. See, e.g., Matter of Richardson, 247 N. Y.
401, 411, 160 N. E. 655, 658 (1928).
3O Experience with respect to the Federal Employers' Liability Act affords
vivid warning of the litigation possibilities instinct in this decision. "Judi-
cial astuteness had to decide, as a solemn problem of constitutional law,
whether a particular employee at a particular moment was acting in his
interstate or intrastate capacity. An erroneous guess on the part of counsel,
a confused ruling by the trial court, subjected the plaintiff to all the waste
and tribulation of delay and frequently of defeat .... Such standards as
were evolved proved elusive in application. The differences of opinion
among the judges stimulated appeal. From both state and lower federal
courts the volume of this litigation steadily increased." FiLNI xURTnR AND
LANDIs, THE BusINEss OF THE SurnArE COURT (1927) 20G-7. An allega-
tion by the employer, honestly made or otherwise, will apparently entitle
him to demand a retrial in the District Court. Although the Act provides
that payment under an award shall not be suspended by the proceedings
for its review, the courts are authorized to stay payment "where irreparable
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ion would make the decision applicable, as pointed out in the
dissent, to a number of other questions. Injured worlunen will
be subjected to a great deal of litigation before employers, law-
yers and district judges learn how far that logic can be driven
and to what extent the jurisdictional fact of "employment" em-
braces such troublesome and champetrous questions as employee
or independent contractor, injury in or outside the course of
damage would otherwise ensue to the employer." (§ 21 (b), 33 U. S. C.
§ 921 (b)). This authority has been exercised by some courts "upon a
showing that the employee was without financial responsibility and would
therefore presumably be unable to return compensation payments received
in the event that the compensation order should ultimately be set aside."
THIRTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE U. S. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION
Co1mIssioN (1929) 70-71. It is small comfort to injured employees, then,
to be told by the Court that "if the court finds that the facts existed which
gave the deputy commissioner jurisdiction to pass upon the claim for com-
pensation, the injunction will be denied in so far as these fundamental queg-
tions are concerned." 52 Sup. Ct. 297. In anticipation of criticism on this
score the Court states that "it cannot be regarded as an impairment of the
intended efficiency of a administrative agency that it is confined to its
proper sphere;"--a proposition which is not in issue. What is in issue is:
What is the "proper sphere," who shall have the power to determine
whether it has been observed and by what procedure shall the determination
be made? The Court assumes that an administrative agency, because it is
administrative, is not competent or trustworthy enough to serve even as the
receptacle for the evidence upon which that determination is to be made by
the district judge. After all, the deputy commissioner and the district judge
are both human beings and both, perhaps, lawyers. The function of the
deputy commissioner in passing upon claims for compensation differs very
little from that of the judge in personal injury cases. There is as much or
as little danger of "bureaucratic" abuses from the one as from the other.
Compare Arnold, The R6le of Substantive Law and Procedure in the Legal
Process (1932) 45 HARv. L. REv. 617, 624-31. In further mitigation of the
possible harm that may be caused by the decision, the Court states that the
"instances which permit of a challenge to the application of the statute,
upon the grounds we have stated, appear to be few;" that out of the many
thousands of cases which have been brought before the deputy commissioners
throughout the 'country review has been sought in "only a small number;"
and that "an inconsiderable proportion of" this small number "involved the
question whether the injury occurred within the maritime jurisdiction or
whether the relation of employment existed." (p. 298). A change of
emphasis may present an entirely different picture. The number of cases
brought before the commissioners are indeed "many thousands;"-39,850
injuries were reported to them in the fiscal year 1930, 28,861, in the fiscal
year 1931. But the number of disputed cases involving compensation pay-
ments in which hearings were held were 895 in 1930 and 905 in 1931. The
number of cases in which judicial review was sought has increased steadily:
15 in 1928, 58 in 1929; 61 in 1930; 102 cases in 1931. ANNUAL REO'RTS,
supra, 1928, p. 34; 1929, p. 70; 1930, pp. 61, 62; 1931, pp. 69, 70, 71. The
decision of District Court in the instant case is dated May 27, 1929; that
of the Circuit Court of Appeals, Nov. 17, 1930. That these decisions wore
followed by a precipitate rise in the number of suits to set aside awards may




employment and so forth.31 Moreover, the decision can be in-
voked probably only when the administrative award is adverse
to the employer,-not when it is adverse to the employee. -
From the viewpoint of compensation for industrial accidents,
the decision is a fit companion for N. Y. Ccntral R. R. v. Win-
field 33 and the cases identified with Southern Pacific R. R. Co.
v. Jensen.3 In the former, the Court held that the Federal Em-
ployer's Liability Act prevented the application of the State
workmen's compensation statutes to railroad employees injured
without "fault" on the part of their employers while engaged
in performing services "directly" in interstate commerce, even
though the Federal Act provided no remedy for such injuries.
Originally, that Act was a humanitarian piece of legislation
passed prior to the enactment by the States of workmen's com-
pensation statutes, and designed to rescue, to some extent, work-
men injured in the railroad industry from the sad plight in which
the State laws left them.: But the Court interpreted it as a
business statute for the protection of interstate railroads from
the bother of variation in state laws and thus prevented the
States from alleviating the plight of those railroad employees in-
jured in interstate commerce who were not provided for in the
Federal Act.3 6
31Brandeis, J., 52 Sup. Ct. at 301, 309. See also supra note 9a.32 When the deputy commissioner finds that the claimant is not an "em-
ployee" of the respondent or that the injury did not occur on navigable
waters, he does not exceed his "jurisdiction" to apply the Act to a case
beyond its "proper sphere." And it has not yet been suggested that a
"constitutional right" of the claimant is violated by a refusal to grant an
award because of an erroneous determination of those facts.
33 244 U. S. 147, 37 Sup. Ct. 546 (1917).
34 244 U. S. 205, 37 Sup. Ct. 524 (1917).3 
"At the time the First Federal Employers' Liability Act was passed
the so-called common law defenses [fellow servant rule, contributory negli-
gence and assumption of risk] remained in force, in large part, in most of
the States, as to railroad employees." "When applied to huge organiza-
tions and hazardous occupations, as in railroading, they practically abolished
the liability of employers to employees; and in so doing they worked great
hardship and apparent injustice. The wrongs suffered were flagrant; the
demand for redress insistent; and the efforts to secure remedial legislation
widespread .... The promoters of remedial action, unable to overcome the
efficient opposition presented in the legislatures of the several States, ap-
pealed to" Congress. Brandeis, J., dissenting in the Winfield case, supra
note 33, at 160, 37 Sup. Ct. at 552.
36 The Act has resulted in a plethora of cases in state and federal courts.
See supra note 30. At this day, with worknen's compensation statutes in
force in all but four of the States, the Federal Act is a strange anomaly.
It is now commonly thought that, paradoxically, the railroads would prefer
to be under compensation statutes but that railroad employees are op-
posed to repeal of the Act, since they would then be deprived of the op.
portunity to try the issue of negligence and secure verdicts, when favor-
able, much in excess of the amounts ordinarily payable under compensation
statutes. If this be true, it is not the first time that "reforms, against
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In the Jensen case and the cases following it, the problem of
compensation for industrial accidents was subordinated, despite
emphatic protests by Congress, 37 to an assumed requirement of
"uniformity" in the maritime law "throughout the country." In
order to prevent "material prejudice to the characteristic fea-
tures of the general maritime law or [interference] with the
proper harmony and uniformity of that law in its international
and interstate relations," 31 the State was prevented from pro-
viding for accident compensation to a workman domiciled in the
State, regularly employed on land in the State by an employer
domiciled and doing business in the State, but unfortunately
injured while on a vessel in the navigable waters of the State-
perhaps the single time during his entire employment that he
was called upon to be on a vessel. 3 Of course, the practical harms
sought to be avoided 40 would not have resulted simply from the
which there has been vigorous protest, have been shown by experience rather
to promote than to injure business interests." Hamilton, Property-Accord-
ing to Locke (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 864, 878, footnote 43.
37 After the decision in the Jensen case, Congress enacted a statute amend-
ing the Judicial Code provision, relating to the admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction of the federal courts, so as to permit of the application of
state compensation acts to employees injured on navigable waters. The
statute was declared unconstitutional in Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart,
253 U. S. 149, 40 Sup. Ct. 438 (1920). Congress thereupon enacted another
statute which differed from the first by exempting masters and members
of the crew. But this statute, also, was declared unconstitutional. Washing-
ton v. Dawson & Co., supra note 17.
3s Supra note 34, at 216, 37 Sup. Ct. at 529.
39 Cf. Brandeis, J. in the Dawson case, supra note 17, at 228-9, 44 Sup.
Ct. at 305-306. In Employers' Liability Assurance Corp. v. Cook, 281 U. S.
233, 50 Sup. Ct. 308 (1930), one Cook was employed at a Ford plant in
Houston, Texas. A vessel owned by the Ford company arrived with a load
of cars for the plant. Cook was directed to aid in unloading the vessel. Ile
was fatally injured while aboard. The Court held that his widow could not
recover compensation under the state statute. Cf. also, John Baizloy Iron
Works v. Span, 281 U. S. 222, 50 Sup. Ct. 306 (1930). (Although these
cases were decided after the passage of the Longshoremen's Act, the injuries
occurred prior thereto.) The cases centering on the Jensen case are as bad a
mess as any in our constitutional law. For, the state acts were held to be
applicable to some injuries despite their occurrence on navigable waters;
and only the Supreme Court seemed to know where the distinguishing line
was. That is, only a majority seemed to know; three or four Justices dis-
sented regularly. For a discussion of cases and for further references, see
Note (1927) 40 HARV. L. REv. 485; Robinson, Recent Interpretations of tMe
Federal Statutes Concerning Maritime Workers (1930) 5 Tur. L. Ruv. 120;
Voss, Admiralty Jurisdiction and Uniformity of Maritime Workmen's Righta,
id. at 123; Notes (1924) 6 ILL. L. Q. 157, 321; (1927) 22 ILL. L. REv. 92;
(1927) 75 PA. L. Rav. 469. Although the chances of mischief are smaller,
the legal problem has not been obviated by the Longshoremen's Act; for, by
its terms, the Act is limited to cases in which recovery through workmen's
compensation proceedings "may not validly be provided by State law."
40 The Court was concerned not simply with "uniformity in respect to
maritime matters . . . and freedom of navigation between the States and
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application of state compensation acts to this kind of workmen
-nor, indeed, from a more extensive application to longshore-
men and harbor workers generally. The fear was of the unstated
and unknown possible "consequences" that might follow the
establishment of a precedent of this kind for State variation of
the "maritime law"-"consequences" presumably beyond possible
control by the Supreme Court, once the bar were let down and
this type of State statute permitted to apply. To preserve a
largely verbal "uniformity" in the maritime law "throughout the
country" the States were, and are, prevented from requiring the
usual compensation benefits for some 300,000 of their working-
men who, at one time or another are subject to injury on naviga-
ble waters.
To supply to this class of workmen the needed compensation
benefits, "which may not validly be provided by State Law," Con-
gress enacted, with the Court's previous blessing,- the Long-
shoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. And now
we have "uniformity." Of course, there is not and cannot be
uniformity in actual fact. The shipping industry does, in fact,
have to reckon with variety in State compensation laws. It must
comply with the State acts as well as with the Federal Act; for
if a stevedore, for example, engaged in the unit operation of
loading a vessel, is injured while he is on the dock, the State act
provides the exclusive remedy.42 Moreover, though the Long-
shoremen's Act is in force alike in New York, Alabama, Texas
with foreign countries," but also with "investments in ships .. . [and] limi-
tation upon the liability of their owners." Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen,
supra note 34, at 217-18, 37 Sup. Ct. at 529-30.
41 Washington v. Dawson & Co., svpra note 17, at 227, 44 Sup. Ct. at "05.
42 Deputy Commissioner Pillsbury reported in 1929 that his office then
had "records of about 2,230 ... employers [insured under the Federal Act],
of whom probably fifty have regular and extensive operations under [that
Act]. The remainder for the most part may be slightly exposed to its opera-
tions from time to time, sufficiently so as to require insurance protection."
He cites an instance of "certification of insurance under the federal act for
a city water works in the interior of a state located more than 100 miles
from the nearest navigable river." Pillsbury, Administration of the Long-
shoreme?'s Compensation Act On the Patific Coast (1929) 19 AMt. LAB.
LEG. REv. 257. That the administration of the Federal Act alongside the
state acts causes avoidable duplication in governmental expenditures vwould
seem to be highly probable,--and quite significant in days of budgetary
difficulties. For the fiscal year 1931, the United States Commission estimated
the "expense attributable directly to the administration" of the Longshore-
men's Act at $289,165. REproT (1931) at 79. It is interesting also that since
the Federal Act, modeled after that of New York provides for benefits gen-
erally larger than those prescribed in the States and since it is applicable
even in the four states which have no compensation laws, the pecuniary bur-
den on the shipping industry is probably larger than what it would have
been had the State statutes been permitted application to the employees
covered in the Federal Act. This is but another illustration of the deviltry
of "reforms." Supra note 36.
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and Oregon, the amount of compensation payable under the Act
is largely dependent on the injured workmen's wages. And wages
in New York do differ from those in Alabama, Texas and Ore-
gon. But the abstract maritime law is harmoniously uniform.
Whether in New York or Alabama, a stevedore disabled by an
injury aboard a vessel must be paid 2/3 of X during his dis-
ability.43
Crowell v. Benson carries on in this tradition. The employ-
ment relation and navigable waters as the locale of the injury
are said to underlie the constitutionality of the Longshoremen's
Act. Thus, although Congress presumably has power to "alter
or revise" the maritime law as to contracts within the admiralty
jurisdiction even when they are to be performed in whole or in
part on land, and though Congress presumably may impose obli-
gations of one sort or another on persons engaged in maritime
occupations, it is said to lack power to prescribe compensation
payments to maritime workmen injured on land. For, work-
men's compensation is regarded, apparently, as a phase of the
employer's liability for a "tort" to his employee; liability for a
tort is governed by the law of the place where the injury occurs;
and if the injury occurs on land it is beyond the maritime law,
the admiralty jurisdiction and the power of Congress. Again,
compensation for industrial accidents is a private matter between
employer and employee which is limited by the "constitutional
right" of the employer not to be deprived of his property with-
out "due process of law." "It cannot be maintained," say the
majority, that Congress can prescribe "liability without fault"
for all maritime torts. Workmen's compensation was provided,
and sustained against attack under the due process clause, in
cases between employer and employee. Therefore, "in the absence
of other justification," the employment relation is the "pivot" of
the plan and its constitutionality. Otherwise, the employer would
be denied due process. 44 But this argument seems to forget that
the injured and his beneficiaries are deprived by compensation
plans of substantial rights fully as clear as those of the defend-
ants. Such a mutual sacrifice in the interest of a socially eco-
.nomical distribution of losses would seem to be sufficient "justifi-
43 § 8, 33 U. S. C. § 908: "In case of total disability ... 66 per contum
of the average weekly wages shall be paid to the employee during [its]
continuance. .. "
44 Cf. Brandeis, J., in Washington v. Dawson & Co., supra note 17, at 230,
233, 44 Sup. Ct. at 306, 307; and in the instant case, 52 Sup. Ct. at 304. In
New York, the State Insurance Fund sells compensation insurance in com-
petition with private insurance companies. It is significant that while the
latter have appealed to the courts in a multitude of cases from awards of
the Industrial Board, the State Insurance Fund has never prosecuted such
an appeal. NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD, THE WoICXMHN'Cs COM-
PENSATION PROBLEM IN NEw YORK (1927) 45.
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cation" for a compensation plan even between strangers. More-
over it is stated in this very case that "liability without fault is
not unknown to the maritime law" and that Congress has power
to "alter and revise" that law. And only recently has the court
admonished that, in the absence of express prohibition, a statute
regulating commercial or industrial relations is not to be de-
clared invalid unless its validity is justified, but, on the contrary,
is to be presumed constitutional until "a factual foundation of
record" proves it otherwise.- Yet here, without any such
foundation, and unnecessarily, the Court casts serious doubt upon
legislative powers which may prove to be of such importance.
But it must be obvious that, excepting danger of extension to
other fields, it would not "sap the judicial power" or "establish a
bureaucratic" government to hold merely that Congress could
provide that the federal courts were not to make an independent
redetermination upon a new record of the facts concerning locale
of injury and status of employment in cases under the Long-
shoremen's Act. The instances in which these facts could be
challenged were stated "to be few" and to constitute "an incon-
siderable proportion" of the "small number" of cases under the
Act in which "review by the courts has been sought." " The con-
sequence of an erroneous determination in such a case by the
administrative is limited to the payment by the employer or his
insurance carrier of a comparatively small amount of money-
at the most $25 per week "during the continuance of the injured
workman's disability."47 Confessedly, the particular matter in-
volved in Crowell v. Benson was indeed trivial. Our system of
government could not depend upon the scope or mode of judicial
review of administrative awards for industrial accidents. But
again the majority of the Court looked beyond the specific case
to dangers of the "principle." Again fear of the dangerous slew
the innocuous. For the majority was concerned, not with the ad-
ministration of workmen's compensation under the act, but rather
with "preparedness" against the establishment of a bureaucratic
government. And herein lies the greatest significance of the
case; the harm for which it will be most remembered.
Since the primary concern is to save us from bureaucracy,
"judicial review" and "administrative finality" are regarded not
"vertically" or "organically" in relation "to the implications of
the particular interests that invoke 'judicial review,' or as to
45See Hamilton, The Jurists Art (1931) 31 COL. L. Rmr. 1073; Comment
(1931) 41 YAE L. J. 262; NOTE (1931) 31 COL. L. REV. 113.
46 Cf. supra note 30.
47 § 6 (b), 39 U. S. C. § 906 (b) : "Compensation for disability shall not
exceed $25 per week... 2' Specific limitations are put upon the number of
weeks during which compensation is payable in the event of permanent
partial disability. § 8, 33 U. S. C. § 908.
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which 'administrative' discretion is exercised," but "horizon-
tally," "miscellaneously," in general.4s Whether by virtue of the
due process clause or the "separation of powers" doctrine, fact
findings of all administrative bodies, whether federal or state,
must be subject to independent judicial redetermination (and, in
the federal courts, in disregard of the record before the adminis-
trative, when the petitioner so desires) if the findings are placed
within stated metaphysical categories. The importance of the
facts sought to be redetermined is not measured by the practical
controversy involved; nor is the relation of the administrative
power to dangers of bureaucracy determined by the character,
powers and functions of the specific tribunal in question,-the
exigencies of the particular scheme and the practical opportuni-
ties for tyranny. Rather, the controlling thing is the high-sound-
ing term used to label the facts sought to be reviewed-"jurisdic-
tional," "fundamental," "constitutional right." Thus, the District
Judge said: "I can see no distinction between valuing the prop-
erty of a waterworks plant for rate making purposes, by a com-
mission, and the determination by a deputy commissioner that an
employer is liable to an employee for a given sum because of an
injury suffered while in the employment." 41 The vision of the
majority of the Court was, in this respect, equally undiscerning:
"In cases brought to enforce constitutional rights, the judicial
power of the United States necessarily extends to the independent
determination of all questions, both of fact and law, necessary to
the performance of that supreme function. The case of confisca-
tion is illustrative. . . ." 1o
The dissenting Justices did not espouse the cause of bureau-
cracy. They pleaded for a realistic treatment of the case; for a
dissection of "administrative finality" and "judicial review" with
reference to the specific tribunals involved, the character of the
issues sought to be reviewed, the type of hearing accorded by the
administrative body, the procedures prescribed by Congress or
otherwise available for the exercise of the power to review; and
primarily, for a severance of the question as to what record shall
form the basis of judicial review from the questions regarding
the extent of administrative finality and the scope of review.
They pleaded for discriminate slaying by reason and in the light
of actual danger rather than wholesale execution by ghosts. To
them, "in no event [could] the issues presented in the review of
rate orders alleged to be confiscatory, which involve difficult
questions of mixed law and fact, be deemed parallel to those pre-
sented in the review of workmen's compensation awards." o'
4 s FRANKFURTER AND DAVISON, supra note 28, at viii.
4q33 F. (2d) 137, 141.
50 52 Sup. Ct. at 296.
- Id. at 308.
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In rate regulation, the decision in Crowell v. Bea2son adds to
the obstacle created by the Ben Avon case another and perhaps
more serious one.52 The issue of confiscation is presented by an
allegation to that effect in the utility's petition. It can rarely be
determined without a consideration of the whole case. All other
issues of law and fact generally relate to it and "underlie" it.
They must first be determined in order to reach the question of
confiscation. The Court now states that the utility is entitled
not only to an independent judicial determination, but, in the
Federal courts, to a trial de qzovo. The utility may "coast"
through the commission proceedings, save its evidence, present
it for the first time in the court proceedings and compel the
administrative action to go for naught. In the states a variety of
procedures is prescribed for the review of orders of state tri-
bunals. But very infrequently is a trial de qzovo provided. The
Court states that the decision in Crowell v. Benson does not re-
quire a trial de novo in such cases in the state courts (although
there is danger, indeed, that state courts may view the decision
as a persuasive analogy for the interpretation of the clauses of
the state constitutions which are similar to Article III). But
the decision sanctions at least, if it does not require, a practice
current in the Federal courts of conducting a complete new trial
in suits brought to enjoin orders of state commissions on the
ground of repugnance to the Federal Constitution." The practice
52 It is hardly necessary to remark that the Crowell case was a compensa-
tion, not a confiscation, suit; and that, consequently, it makes no technical
"holding" as to confiscation. Yet it is difficult to repress the feeling that
the Court was addressing itself to confiscation rather than compensation
cases. In Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U. S. 420, 50 Sup.
Ct. 220 (1930), the question was raised by the Court whether, on review
of an order of the Secretary of Agriculture under the Packers and Stock-
yards Act, at trial de novo was necessary on the issue of confiscation. The
Court did not then express an opinion on the question because, it said,
the issue was important, was not argued on counsel and did not call for
decision, since confiscation was not shown even by the new evidence.
53 Supra note 26.
5 This inference may be mistaken. The "separation of powers" doctrine,
on which alone the requirement of a trial d novo is grounded does not
limit the "distribution of powers" between State and nation. The Court
does not seem to have said expressly that the "due process" clause, under
which state utility cases are reviewed in the federal courts, requires a trial
de novo on the issue of confiscation. But a footnote in the opinion of Mr.
Justice Brandeis states: "It is cause for regret that the Court in determin-
ing this controversy should have declared, obiter, that in matters of state
public utility regulation involving administrative action of a special char-
acter, and raising questions under a different constitutional provision, a
mode of procedure is required contrary to that almost universally established
under state law... ." 52 Sup. Ct. 308, footnote 59. It is not clear whether
the reference is to the procedure "required" on review in the state courts
or in injunction proceedings in the federal courts. Neither meaning finds
express support in the Court opinion.
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has caused unfortunate irritation between the State and Federal
governments and serious embarrassment in the state regulation
of local utilities.5 5 The Court could avoid this by limiting the
court record to that before the Commission. But, in view of the
Crowell case, the remedy must be sought in bills such as have
been often proposed, 0 similar to § 3243, introduced in the pres-
ent Congress by Senator Johnson at the request of the California
Railroad Commission, to withdraw from the federal courts their
jurisdiction in state public utility rate cases.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Crowell v. Bcnscm
not "to review the particular facts, but to pass upon the question
of principle." And, true to its word, it disregarded "the particu-
lar facts" and established a principle unrelated to fact. It has
saddled on administration a burden which it must in time re-
move,-but not until the decision will have haunted administra-
tion and the courts for many years.
ASSIGNMENTS FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS AS AN ACT
OF BANKRUPTCY
RECENT investigations 1 have provided a factual basis for the
criticism of some aspects of the operation of the National Bank-
ruptcy Act.2 Its primary function-to provide a method by
which the assets of an insolvent debtor may be liquidated, and
distributed proportionately among his creditors-has been ful-
filled with only partial success. For while the safeguards of the
rights of creditors have assured impartiality of distribution,3
inherent weaknesses in the system have minimized the dividends
received; 4 and whatever be the importance in theory of the scru-
pulous preservation of abstract rights, creditors are likely to
measure the effectiveness of protection by an exclusively mone-
tary yardstick.
Various factors have contributed to the failure of the system
successfully to accomplish its ends. Inefficiency of the liquidat-
55 Hearings, supra note 26, at 57-39.
56 See Hearings, supra note 26, at 105. In the Seventy-first Congress,
nine bills of this kind were introduced.
1 See Administration of Bankrupt Estates (Gov. Print. Off. 1931) House
Committee Print. 71st Cong. 3d Sess.; Thacher, Proposed Change in Banl-.
ruptcy Act (1931) 3 N. Y. STATE BAR Assoc. BuLL. 532; Douglas, Some
Fundtional Aspects of Bankruptcy (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 329.
2 30 STAT. 544 (1898), 11 U. S. C. (1927).
See Glenn, A Study in the Development of Creditors' Rights (1914) 14
COL. L. REV. 279, 491.
4 The average return to creditors on their claims during the last six




ing machinery of the Bankruptcy court has generally occasioned
substantial loss in the realized value of the debtor's assets,3 and
a considerable portion of the amount realized is consumed by
the expenses of a necessarily long administration.0 Further-
more, despite the theory of creditor-control on which the Act is
predicated, a large number of creditors have been unwilling to
co-operate in a lengthy and probably unprofitable undertaking,
with the inevitable result that the representative character of
the proceedings has been seriously impaired.7
Dissatisfaction with the system has led to the increasingly fre-
quent use of extra-judicial methods of liquidation, of which the
so-called "friendly adjustment," sponsored by the National Asso-
ciation of Credit Alen, represents perhaps the most efficient
type.8 The friendly adjustment ordinarily takes the the form
of an assignment for benefit of creditors, with usually the
local branch manager of the credit association as trustee. The
objects of the friendly adjustment for the most part parallel
those of the Bankruptcy Act, but it functions with a considerably
higher degree of success.9
Such success has been attributed in large part to the use of a
permanent liquidating agent, equipped with a staff skilled in
the administration of insolvent estates. The cost of administra-
tion is considerably less than in bankruptcy, 0 and by reason of
With the exception of a few jurisdictions, such as the Southern District
of New York where the Irving Trust Co. has recently been appointed
receiver in all cases, liquidation is carried on by a receiver or trustee with
neither the experience nor equipment necessary to accomplish satisfactory
results. Thus while a private sale is theoretically possible, in practice the
assets have usually been sold at public auction, with all the disadvantages
attendant upon forced sales. See Billig, What Price Bankruptcy: A Pica
for "Friendly Adjustment' (1929) 14 CoRN. L. Q. 413, 417.
6 The various fees required under the Act, and incidental expenses have
consumed on the average about 255 of the total amount realized. See
Billig, op. cit. supra, at 419. C.f. In re Oakland Lumber Co., 174 Fed. 634
(C. C. A. 2d, 1909) ; In re Refund Cash Grocery, 30 F. (2d) 158 (D. Idaho
1928); See Hagar, General Assignments and the Bankruptcy Law (1917)
27 YALE L. J. 210.
T See Douglas and Marshall, A Factual Study of Bankruptcy Adminis-
tration, and Some Suggestions (1932) 32 COL. L. Rnv. 25, 26, ct seq.
s The advantages of the friendly adjustment system have been admirably
presented in recent articles. See Bihig, op. cit. supra, note 5; Billig, Extra,
Judicial Administration of Insolvent Estates (1930) 78 U. op P,% L. REv.
293. Specific claims made for -the device have been disputed, but the advan-
tages of the system conceded. Gamer, On Comparig "Frieuly Adjuist-
mene' and Bankrnptcy (1930) 16 CORN. L. Q. 35.
9 An average yearly record (1926-1927) for 18 bureaus reports dividends
to creditors of 27.45% of claims, and 73.42o of realized amounts. Divi-
dends under bankruptcy administration for 20 districts during the same
period amounted to 5.80% of claims, and 43.32% of realized amounts. See
Billig, op. cit. supra note 5, at 432.
10 Comparative records disclose an administration cost of 13.85% of real-
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the nature of the liquidating agency, a high degree of creditor
co-operation has thus far been obtained."'
The utility of this device is subject to definite limitations; e. g.,
legal machinery is essential to reach the concealed assets of a
fraudulent debtor.12 But even in the normal 11 case of an ineffi-
cient rather than a dishonest debtor, its effectiveness may be
seriously impaired by the fact that the assignment it contem-
'plates is of itself an act of bankruptcy, and dissatisfied creditors
may either force the case into bankruptcy, or capitalize on
their nuisance value to secure an unwarranted advantage."
It has therefore been suggested 1 that section 3 of the Bank-
ruptcy Act be so modified as to provide that under certain coli-
ditions an assignment for the benefit of creditors should not
constitute an act of bankruptcy. Pending amendment of the Act,
however, it may be possible to facilitate friendly adjustments
through a transaction outside the category of assignments for
benefit of creditors within the meaning of section 3.
To constitute an act of bankruptcy, it is not essential that the
assignment conform to the technical requirements of state stat-
utes.16 The form which the conveyance may take is similarly
unimportant, whether it purport to be a sale,"7 a mortgage with
a defeasance clause.- or a confession of judgment to a trustee."
A conveyance directly to the creditors and not in trust has often
been said not to be an assignment for benefit of creditors, " but
ized amounts under the friendly adjustment system, as opposed to 24.26%
in bankruptcy. Supra note 9.
1See Douglas and Marshall, op. cit. supra note 7, at 44.
See Billig, Extra-Judicial Administration of Insolvent Estates, supra
note 8, at 296.
13 Id. at 297.
14 A creditor accepting or acquiescing in the consummation of the assign-
ment is estopped to petition the debtor in bankruptcy. In re Creech Bros.
Lumber Co., 240 Fed. 8 (C. C. A. 9th, 1917); Doty v. Mason, 244 Fed.
587 (S. D. Fla. 1917). This is not true, however, if the assignment is
procured by fraud or is void in its entirety. Canner v. Webster Tapper
Co. 168 Fed. 519 (C. C. A. 1st, 1909); Comment (1932) 41 YAI L. J.
603, 606.
1 See Douglas and Marshall, op. cit. supra, note 7, at 45.
16 Courtenay Mercantile Co. v. Finch, Van Slyck & McConville, 194 Fed.
368 (C. C. A. 8th, 1912); In re Meyer, 98 Fed. 976 (C. C. A. 2d, 1899).
And whether it be statutory or at common law. In re Dautz, 272 Fed,
349 (D. Ind. 1921). And though it be in a foreign country. In re Ber-
thoud, 231 Fed. 529 (S. D. N. Y. 1916).
17 In re Saxer, 34 F. (2d) 39 (E. D. Mich. 1929) ; In re Thomlinson Co.,
154 Fed. 834 (C. C. A. 8th, 1907).
1s In re Heleker Bros.. Mercantile Co., 216 Fed. 963 (D. Kan, 1914);
Garrison v. Pilliod Cabinet Co., 50 F. (2d) 1035 (C. C. A. 10th, 1931).
10 In re Green, 106 Fed. 313 (E. D. Pa. 1901).
20 Anniston Iron & Supply Co. v. Anniston Rolling Mill Co., 125 Fed,
974, 976 (N. D. Ala. 1903); In re McCrum, 214 Fed. 207, 210 (C. C. A. 2d,
1914); 1 REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY § 153, n. 48.
such a transfer would eliminate the liquidating agency which
is an integral feature of the friendly adjustment plan. Liquida-
tion by direct transfer to creditors is not only inefficient and im-
practical, but offers unrestricted scope for fraud.
A transfer of only a part of the debtor's assets does not come
within the inhibitions of section 3a (5) of the Banlruptcy Act,2
though the decided cases do not permit any generalization as to
what percentage of the assets is required to bring the transfer
within the category of a "general assignment." In Missouri-
American Electric Co. v. Hamilton Brown Shoe Co.,2- a case often
cited as holding that a partial assignmenf is not an act of bank-
ruptcy, the court held that where the debtor had assigned three-
fourths of his assets to his largest creditor in consideration of the
latter's release of its claim and an agreement to pay all other
creditors of the grantor out of the proceeds of the property as-
signed no act of bankruptcy had been committed. Following this
case it has been held that an assignment of slightly more than
five-sixths of the debtor's assets in trust for creditors is not a
"general assignment" within the Bankruptcy Act.-  If the issue
as to the substantiality of the assigned assets is a close one, the
court's inquiry will probably be directed more toward the nature
of the transfer and the intention of the debtor rather than any
precise quantitative analysis of the assignment.24
But in order to make the excepted category of partial assign-
ments available for use in friendly adjustments a series of such
assignments would be required and while the issue has not been
squarely presented in a bankruptcy case, -5 the court might well
be influenced by the analogy to cases arising under state statutes
and where each assignment is made in accordance with a pre-
conceived plan, construe the series as a single transaction so as
to become a general assignment.20
Although there would seem to be no satisfactory substitute
for a general assignment which would be likely to survive chal-
lenge by a non-assenting creditor relying on the Bankruptcy Act,
certain devices have been successfully used to facilitate extra-
2132 STAT. 797 (1903), 11 U. S. C. § 21 (1926).
22165 Fed. 283 (C. C. A. 8th, 1908).
23 In re McCrum, supra note 20.
24 In In re Russell, 291 Fed. 909 (D. Mlass. 1923), a general assignment
was held to be an act of bankruptcy though the court assumed that a portion
of the real estate might not pass by the law of the situs. In In re Hous-
man, 7 F. (2d) 329 (C. C. A. 9th, 1925), the court on appeal held that
though a very substantial portion of the debtor's assets had not been con-
veyed the master's finding that an act of bankruptcy had been committed
would not be disturbed since the parties had regarded the assignment as a
"general" one.
25 Cf. In re Salmon & Salmon, 143 Fed. 395 (W. D. Mlo. 1906).




judicial liquidation, which do not in themselves provide the
means for forcing the case into bankruptcy. In many cases it
may prove advisable for the debtor to deposit the deed of assign-
ment in escrow pending the acceptance by the creditors of a
composition agreement or pending the securing of all the credi-
tors' assent to the assignment, so as to estop a later petition in
bankruptcy. The deposit of the deed of assignment in escrow
is not an act of bankruptcy, since to constitute a "general assign-
ment" there must be a conveyance of the legal and equitable
interests of the debtor in his assets.2 7 Another device frequently
resorted to is the appdintment of one or more persons as agents
with power of attorney to liquidate the debtor's estate and pay
all the creditors. As long as the power of attorney to liquidate
contains no words of conveyance or assignment it does not come
within the inhibition of the Bankruptcy Act .2  A third device
is suggested by the factual set-up in In re Bartleson,2D where a
majority of the stock of a corporation had been transferred to a
committee of creditors for purposes set out in a voting trust
agreement, under which the creditors were made directors of
the corporation, and an agreement relating to the continuation
of the business by the committee had been sent to all the creditors
for their signature. The court held that this was not an act of
bankruptcy. Although a corporate debtor was here involved,
there would seem to be no objection to the incorporation of an
individual debtor for this specific purpose. Under such an ar-
rangement the creditors could control the liquidation of the cor-
porate assets and if the distribution is not preferential the Bank-
ruptcy Act need not be feared.30
27 Carpenter & Co. v. Lybrand, 230 Fed. 84 (C. C. A. 4th, 1915). Cf.
In re Federal Lumber Co., 185 Fed. 926 (D. Mass. 1910). On the necessity
of an actual conveyance, see In re Hartwell Oil Mills, 165 Fed. 555 (D. Ga.
1908).
28 In re Ambrose Matthews & Co., 229 Fed. 309 (D. N. J. 1916).
20 275 Fed. 390 (S. D. Fla. 1920).
30 If the creditors do liquidate the assets in this manner care should be
had not to dissolve the corporation before liquidation if the state statute
provides that a receiver or trustee in liquidation shall be appointed in such
event. Such receiver or trustee in liquidation will probably be a "receiver
or trustee" within the Bankruptcy Act. See In re Bennett Shoo Co., 140
Fed. 687 (D. Conn. 1905); In re Hercules Atkin Co., 133 Fed. 813 (E. D.
Pa. 1904); Haubtman & Loeb Co. v. Dunbar Molasses Co., 13 F. (2d) 335
(C. C. A. 5th, 1926). But see Jacobs v. Collegiate Preparatory School
Inc., 300 Fed. 734, 735 (D. Conn. 1924), And see Moody-Horman-Boel-
hauwe v. Clinton Wire Cloth Co., 246 Fed. 653 (C. C. A. 5th, 1917) where
the appointment of the directors as liquidating trustees pursuant to disso-
lution under a state statute was held to be an assignment for the benefit
of creditors and so an act of bankruptcy without regard to the debtor's
solvency. Cf. In re Empire Metallic Bedstead Co., 98 Fed. 981 (C. C. A.
2d, 1899). Since consent to the appointment of an equity receiver to
liquidate the corporation is not an assignment for the benefit of creditors
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Though these devices offer no protection against attaching
creditors and though they are admittedly temporary expedients,
they do provide methods by which creditors can exercise control
over the debtors' assets pending an agreement between them-
selves on the plan of liquidation; and since no act of bankruptcy
is involved the non-assenting creditors are deprived to a consid-
erable extent of their nuisance value.
ALLOCATION AS BETWEEN LIFE-TENANT AND)
RE"MAINDERMAN OF CORPORATE DIVTIDENDS
PAID ON LIQUIDATION
IN an effort to establish some measure of uniformity in the
award of corporate dividends as between life tenant and remain-
derman where the testator has failed to define the terms principal
and income,' the Commissioners on Uniform Laws have drafted
into the Uniform Principal and 1ncome Act 2 the Massachusetts
rule that cash dividends go to the life tenant as income, while
stock dividends constitute an integral part of the corpus to be
preserved for the remainderman. 3 The allocation thus depends
upon the discretionary action of directors in declaring or with-
holding profits or in capitalizing them. Earnings, although they
are income of the corporation, do not constitute income of the
shareholder, and hence of the life tenant, unless and until they
are declared as cash dividends.4 Stock dividends, representing
capitalization of earnings in the hands of the corporation, accrue
to corpus since there has been no severance of corporate assets.2
the Moody case is hardly sound. U. S. v. Middle States Oil Co., 18 F. (2d)
231 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927); In re McKeehan Furniture Co., 24 F. (2d) 870
(S. D. Fla. 1927). Nolte v. Hudson Navigation Co., 8 F. (2d) 859 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1925). But cf. Davis v. Miller-Link Lumber Co., 296 Fed. 649
(C. C. A. 5th, 1924).
IThe intention of the testator, if there be one ascertainable from the
terms of the instrument, must govern. In re Osborne, 209 N. Y. 450, 103
N. E. 723, 823 (1913). For a suggested method of expressing such inten-
tion so as to obviate many of the difficulties discussed in this comment, see
Bonus Distributions: Capital or Izcome? (1931) 171 L. T. 148, 149.
2 NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMzISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAr.S,
41st Annual Conferenee, 1931, Report of Committee on Uniform Principal
and Income Act, Fourth Tentative Draft. Oregon adopted the Act (March
11, 1931) in an earlier draft. ORE. LAWS (1931) c. 371.
3 Uniform Principal and Income Act, supra note 2, § 5; Minot v. Paine,
99 Mass. 101 (1868).
4 Gibbons v. Mahon, 136 U. S. 549, 10 Sup. Ct. 1057 (1890); Minot v.
Paine, supra note 3. Contra: In re Duffill's Estate, 180 Cal. 748, 183 Pae.
337 (1919); Cobb v. Fant, 36 S. C. 1, 14 S. E. 959 (1892); Prithitt v.
Nashville Trust Co., 96 Tenn. 472, 36 S. W. 1064 (1896).
5 Gibbons v. Mahon; Minot v. Paine, both supra note 4. For discussion
(with illuminating examples) of this severance test of income as embodied
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The Pennsylvania, or so-called American rule, however, disre-
gards corporate action and apportions dividends whether cash or
stock, as principal and income according as they are declared
out of earnings realized prior to the establishment of the trust or
subsequent thereto.,
When the fund to be allocated consists of dividends resulting
from liquidation of the corporation, the Massachusetts rule is not
literally applicable.7 Dividends paid upon liquidation accrue
entirely to corpus, even if they contain undivided and accumu-
lated profits, on the theory that where the directors have failed
or deemed it inadvisable to exercise their power to declare divi-
dends, such power is now at an end, and only the single duty
remains of distributing everything, in their hands to the share-
holders whose rights to participate in distribution of the corpora-
tion's capital assets have now maturedA Where the liquidation
takes the form of a complete winding up of the business, all the
assets being converted into cash for distribution along with any
undivided surplus upon the stockholders' surrender of their cer-
tificates, the rule in regard to liquidation dividends finds further
support in the analogy of a sale of stock held in trust, the pro-
ceeds of which are held to represent a mere change in the form
of the corpus.,
There are, however, cases of liquidation short of Winding up
the business. The assets of the corporation as a going concern,
or the stock representative thereof, may be transferred to an-
other corporation. The cash consideration which is received and
distributed as a dividend here constitutes corpus, on the analogy
again of a mere change-in the trust res.10 Likewise, where, upon
in both American and English decisions involving the rights of life tenant
and remainderman, see Walter Strachan, A Company's Capital or Incomo
(1930) 46 LAw Q. REv. 334.
6 In re Earp's Appeal, 28 Pa. 368 (1857). The various rules are reviewed
briefly in BALLANTINE, MANUAL 0F CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE (1930)
§ 163. There has been growing dissatisfaction with the Pennsylvania rule
due to the extreme complexities of its application. William R. Scott, Cor-
porate Stocks in Pennsylvania Trusts (1928) 34 PA, BAR Ass'N 342; and
a growing advocacy of the Massachusetts rule of convenience. See Note
(1931) 16 CORN. L. Q. 616.
7 UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT, supra note 2, § 5 (3).
8 Gifford v. Thompson, 115 Mass. 478 (1874).
9Ibid; Wheeler v. Perry, 18 N. H. 307 (1846); cf. Curtis v. Osborn, 79
Conn. 555, 65 At]. 968 (1907) and Brownell v. Anthony, 189 Mass. 442,
75 N. E. 746 (1905) (both cases of total liquidation of assets by bank
precedent to consolidation with other banks) ; see infra note 14.
1L0 Second Universalist Church of Stamford v. Colegrove, 74 Conn. 79,
49 Atl. 902 (1901). Contra: Hemenway v. Hemenway, 181 Mass. 406, 03
N. E. 919 (1902) wherein on the same facts as those involved in the cited
Connecticut case, it was held that a disbursement of surplus made con-
comitantly with the sale of stock constituted income on the ground that
it was within the directors' power to distribute this surplus as dividends
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a vote to discontinue business, a corporation's assets, including
a large surplus, are sold to another company for the latter's stock,
or stock plus cash, the distribution thereof as a cash dividend 1'
to the selling corporation's shareholders constitutes corpus, the
entire transaction being a liquidation of the shareholders' in-
terest in the old company for a consideration which may include
participation in the new." So too, upon reorganization of a cor-
poration where there is a single transfer of all its assets, includ-
ing surplus, to a newly formed organization, consideration for
which is capital stock in the new corporation, the entire amount
of stock so received by the shareholder, including that attribut-
able to surplus, constitutes corpus. 13 But mere distribution of
surplus by a corporation in consolidation or merger proceedings,
for the purpose of producing an agreed proportion of capital
stock to assets without actual liquidation of other assets, is held
not to be proceeds of liquidation and so not attributable to
made by a going concern. The result in the Connecticut case is to be
approved. The sale of the stock is substantially a liquidation of the old
company insofar as the old shareholders are concerned since, having dis-
posed of their stock, they no longer retain any share of control in the buying
corporation. It seems unjust to hold that the surplus involved, which would
enhance the value of the shareholder's stock if sold on the open market,
constitutes income to the life tenant merely because, already existing in
cash form, it is reserved for distribution rather than "sold" for an equiv-
alent amount of cash, since it is a reasonable inference that the surplus
would not have been distributed except in contemplation of the sale. The
distribution, therefore, seems not really one of dividends but one consti-
tuting part payment in consideration of the shareholder's surrender of
his shares. The Massachusetts emphasis on the existence of a going con-
cern is further illustrated in Talbot v. Milliken, 221 Mass. 367, 108 N. E.
1060 (1915) (sale of "757 of the stock). It is submitted that the emphasis
in each case should be, not on the continued corporate existence as a going
concern but whether the particular trust stock involved participates in this
continued existence. Here certain shareholders' 75% interest was liquidatcd
by sale of that amount of stock to a corporation in which they would have
no interest. As to the other 25/ a surplus distribution might well have
constituted income, since their shares were not surrendered.
"1 Dividends paid in stock other than that of the declaring corporation
constitute cash dividends. Stock dividends are declared in shares of the
declaring corporation, representing an increased capitalization. Union and
New Haven Trust Co. v. Taintor, 85 Conn. 452, 83 At. 697 (1912); Gray
v. Hemenway, 212 Mass. 239, 98 N. E. 789 (1912).
- Wilberding v. Miller, 90 Ohio St. 23, 106 N. E. 665 (1914).
'3 Anderson v. Bean, 272 Mass. 432, 172 N. E. 647 (1930) ; Note (1931)
9 TEx. L. Rv. 462; cf. In re Armitage, 3 Ch. Div. 337 (1893); Cleveland
Trust Co. v. Hickox, 32 Ohio App. 69, 167 N. E. 592 (1929) (an extreme
view regarding as liquidation a mere change in the evidence of ownership
from par value stock into shares of no par value) ; ef. infra note 14. For
a different attack on similar facts arising under reorganization of the same
corporation involved in Cleveland Trust Co. v. Hickox, see Bothwell v.
Estep, 6 Pac. (2d) 1108 (Wash. 1932); and infra note 35.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
corpus.1 4
In addition to the special problems of distribution of dividends
from total liquidation which arise under the Massachusetts rule,"5
courts have been confronted with the problem of partial liquida-
tions regardless of which rule they are applying. This arises
where the court construes the dividend to be a "return of cap-
ital," in which case it will award the dividend to the remainder-
man. But use of "return of capital" to determine the rights of
the remainderman necessarily leads to divergent results since the
meaning of "capital" for purposes of allocation of capital and
income as between life tenant and remainderman varies under
the different rules of dividend allocation. Thus, while dividends
in reduction of capital stock clearly constitute a return of capital
in the shareholder's hands, the remainderman's interest in the
proceeds of capital reduction, under the Pennsylvania rule, is
limited to an amount equal to a pro rata share in the capital re-
turn proportionate to the value of the trust stock as of the time
of the creation of the trust. This will include such stock divi-
14 Boardman v. Boardman, 78 Conn. 451, 62 Atl. 339 (1905); Old Colony
Trust Co. v. Shaw, 261 Mass. 158, 158 N. E. 530 (1927); In re Thomas,
2 Ch. Div. 331 (1916). The actual difference, it is submitted, between the
case of Anderson v. Bean, supra note 13, and the cases herein cited is not
one of liquidation for in none of them is the shareholder's interest in the
old corporation liquidated in the sense that he no longer participates in
control or interest in substantially the same assets. Cf. supra note 10. The
result in Anderson v. Bean might well have been put on the basis of a
stock dividend, the stock of the newly formed organization being in sub-
stance the stock of the old corporation with merely a change in evidence
of ownership from share certificates in a Maine corporation to those of a
Massachusetts corporation. Cf. supra note 11; Cleveland Trust Co. v.
Hickox, supra note 13.
15 Under the Pennsylvania rule it is important to ascertain whether there
has been a liquidation, in which case there will be apportionment between
income and corpus (McKeown's Estate, 263 Pa. 78, 106 Atl. 189 (1919) ),
or a merger or consolidation, in which case the issuance of now stock is
considered merely new evidence of ownership not amounting to a division
or distribution of assets calling for an apportionment. Buist's Estate, 297
Pa. 537, 147 Atl. 606 (1929); Note (1930) 78 U. OF PA. L. Rnv. 570; of.
Dupont v. Peyton, 15 Del. Ch. 255, 136 At]. 149 (1927); Note (1927) 11
MINN. L. REv. 659; Ortiz v. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., 159 Atl. 376
(Del. 1931).
The New York Court, despite its purported adherence to the Pennsyl-
vania rule (of. infra -note 31) had so far modified it as to give to the
remainderman upon total liquidation of a corporation its value as a going
concern, i. e., in addition to earnings accrued before the date of the trust
it awarded to corpus the proceeds of sale attributable to the plant, equip-
ment and materials, betterments, good will, patent rights, licenses, trade
marks, rights, privileges and franchises, and working capital. In re Rogers,
22 App. Div. 428, 48 N. Y. Supp. 175 (2d Dep't 1897), aj'd Matter of
Rogers, 161 N. Y. 108, 55 N. E. 393 (1899); Tuttle v. First Nat. Bank
of Paterson, 44 Misc. 318, 89 N. Y. Supp. 820 (1904); In re Stevens, 111
App. Div. 773, 98 N. Y. Supp. 28 (4th Dep't 1906).
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dends as have been declared out of the corporation's earnings
realized prior to the establishment of the trust,10 but not those
declared out of subsequent earnings since they are considered
already to have accrued to the life tenant as income.17 But under
the Massachusetts rule the remainderman's share in the return
of capital would include also those stock dividends declared out
of earnings subsequent to creation of the trust since all stock
dividends are held to accrue to corpus.", Furthermore, under the
Pennsylvania rule, proceeds from the sale of assets comprising
the book value of the corporation at the date of the trust, includ-
ing consideration for any enhancement of value thereof not
ascribable to the investment of subsequent earnings, constitute a
return of capital;: 9 while, under the Massachusetts rule, there
is a return of capital only so far as the distribution is of proceeds
from the sale of assets bought with the original paid-in capital.1
While the Pennsylvania rule by fixing the status of earnings
as income or capital as of the time when earned makes imma-
terial the question of their capitalization, the trend of consider-
able dicta in Massachusetts decisions at one time was to the
16 McKeown's Estate, supra note 15.
37 Supra note 6.
Is Smith v. Dana, 77 Conn. 543, 60 Atl. 117 (1905); Bishop Y. Bishop,
81 Conn. 509, 71 Atl. 583 (1909); cf. D'Ooge v. Leeds, 176 Mass. 558, 57
N. E. 1025 (1900) (issue of corporation's bonds to its shareholders held
equivalent to a stock dividend); Gilkey v. Paine, 80 Me. 319, 14 Atl. 205
(1888).
19 Cf. Vinton's Appeal, 99 Pa. 434 (1882) ; Eisner's Appeal, 175 Pa. 143,
34 At. 577 (1896); Graham's Estate, 198 Pa. 216, 47 Atl. 1108 (1901);
Jackson v. Maddox, 136 Ga. 31, 70 S. E. 865 (1911); Kalbach v. Clark,
133 Iowa 215, 110 N. W. 599 (1907); Ex parte Humbird, 114 Md. 627, SO
Atl. 209 (1911) ; Poole v. Union Trust Co., 191 Mich, 162, 157, N. W. 430
(1916) ; McCoy v. McCloskey, 94 N. J. Eq. 60, 117 AtI. 473 (1922) ; In re
Diehl's Estate, 130 Atl. 220 (N. J. Eq. 1925); In re Skillman's Estate, 9
N. Y. Supp. 469 (1890); Sturgis v. Roche, 122 Misc. 779, 204 N. Y. Supp.
859 (1924); Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Peckham, 42 R. I. 365,
107 Atl. 209, (1919) ; Miller v. Payne, 150 Wis. 354, 136 N. W. 811 (1912);
Estate of Gerlach, 177 Wis. 251, 188 N. W. 94 (1922).
There would seem to be some difference of opinion in cases following the
Pennsylvania rule whether upon sale of the trust stock itself, the increased
price obtained because of surplus due to withholding of earnings realized
during the life tenancy might not accrue to the remainderman as an en-
hancement of value of the corpus. The Pennsylvania court, however, has
followed the doctrine of apportionment to its utmost in declaring an appor-
tionment even in this situation. In re Nirdlinger's Estate, 290 Pa. 457, 139
Atl. 200 (1927); Note (1928) 76 U. oF PA. L. Rnv. 589. But cf. In re
Etzel's Estate, 234 N. W. 210 (Iowa 1931); Note (1931) 29 Micn. L. REV.
953.
2oHeard v. Eldredge, 109 Mlass. 258 (1872). And then, it would seem
only when there is no showing of a surplus from which dividends equal
in amount to those paid out could lawfully have been made. Cf. Gray v.
Hemenway, infra note 23; Lloyd v. Lloyd, 341 Ill. 4G1, 173 N. E. 491
(1930); Note (1931) 8 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 689.
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effect that earnings which had been devoted to the extension
or development of the physical property of the corporation were
to that extent irretrievably capitalized, so that upon conversion
into cash for dividend distribution, such dividends accrued to the
remainderman as a return of capital. 21 However, a distinction
was drawn between permanent capitalization in the form of
.physical assets and investment of earnings as "floating capital :"
e.g., for purchase of shares of stock in subsidiary or alien cor-
porations, the courts stating that since shares of stock were
easily convertible into cash, the directors could not have intended
to capitalize earnings permanently in that form. The result of
this distinction, of course, was to allot dividends resulting from
the conversion of "floating capital" to the life tenant.22 But in
Gray v. Hemenway, 3 the Massachusetts court rejected the dis-
tinction between investment in securities and in physical assets,
pointing out that it is not beyond the lawful power of directors
to convert either into cash where capital is not impaired. It was
consequently decided that cash dividends upon conversion of
physical assets representing investment of earnings as well as
cash dividends upon conversion of stock,24 would be considered
income. In further clarifying its position as to what constitutes
return of capital, the court went on to say,25 "But it is not neces-
sary that the case rest on that ground alone for if it be assumed,
without so deciding, that there has been an 'effectual capitaliza-
tion,' within the meaning of those words in Hemenway v. Hemen-
way,2 6 of the whole or a part of the coal properties sold, and that
this character was likewise impressed on the bonds received in
exchange, it does not follow that the bonds, or the stock received
for them, could not be made available for the payment of a divi-
dend from surplus, provided their equivalent in value remained
in the surplus or otherwise continued to be held as assets of the
corporation 'so that capital would not be impaired. So long as
the assets of a solvent corporation are equal to, or in excess of, its
liabilities plus its original capital, with such additions thereto as
may have been made, the capital cannot be said to be impaired."
This treats dividends as reduction of capital if their payment
constitutes impairment of capital of the going concern and differs
21 See Minot v. Paine, supra note 3, at 107; D'Ooge v. Leeds, supra note
18, at 565, 57 N. E. at 1027; Hemenway v. Hemenway, 8upra note 10, at
410, 63 N. E. at 921; Gray v. Hemenway, supra note 11, at 242, 98 N. E.
at 791; Talbot v. Milliken, supra note 10, at 369, 108 N. E. at 1061; Gray
v. Hemenway, 223 Mass. 293, 296, 111 N. E. 713, 714 (1916).
- Cf. supra note 21.
23 268 Mass. 515, 168 N. E. 102 (1929).
24 Or, of course, the stock may be distributed in kind as a cash dividend,
supra note 11.
2 5 Supra note 23, at 521, 168 N. E. at 104.
26 See supra note 10.
[Vol. 411066
COMMENTS
from that expressed in the Connecticut cases, wherein, upon the
premise that the only possible way of capitalizing earnings is by
formal declaration of a stock dividend,27 "reduction of capital" or
"partial liquidation" is construed to mean reduction either of
capital stock, or of additions thereto by way of stock dividends.23
The Massachusetts rule seems more favorable to the remainder-
man in that it permits an effectual capitalization of earnings up
to the extent that payments out of surplus may be made as pay-
ments of dividends rather than as return of capital only to the
extent that such payments do not impair the capital value of the
going concern. 9
Although the New York courts, until the recent legislative
change,30 professed to follow the Pennsylvania rule that stock
dividends representing corporate earnings during the life ten-
ancy accrued to the life tenant as income,31 the question was not
infrequently raised as to whether such earnings might not be
capitalized by investment in shares of subsidiary or alien cor-
porations, so as to go to the remainderman upon conversion and
distribution. This doubt, however, has been clearly resolved in
the negative.3 2 And while there appears to be no New York case
dealing squarely with the distribution by a concern, not in com-
plete liquidation, of dividends derived from the sale of physical
assets in which corporate earnings during the life tenancy had
been invested, there can be little doubt that the New York courts
in this respect, whether following the Pennsylvania or Massachu-
setts cases, would treat such a cash dividend as income, :3 where
the capital of the corporation was not impaired, the capital for
this purpose being reckoned at the book value of the corporation
as of the date of trust.34
In a recent case 3 the Supreme Court of Washington was faced
for the first time with the question of the respective rights of
life tenant and remainderman to a corporate dividend. More than
ten years after the testatrix's death, the corporation sold all the
assets of a subsidiary which it had owned at the time of her de-
cease and voted to distribute to its shareholders in exchange for
-7Smith v. Dana, supra note 13.28 Smith v. Dana; Bishop v. Bishop, both su'pra note 18.
29 Gray v. Hemenway, supra note 23.
20 N. Y. PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW (1926) § 17-a.
33In re Osborne, supra note 1; Note (1931) 16 CoRN. L. Q. 616.
a United States Trust Co. v. Heye, 224 N. Y. 242, 120 N. E. 645 (1918)
aif'g 181 App. Div. 544, 168 N. Y. Supp. 1051 (Ist Dep't 1918); Macy
v. Ladd, 128 Misc. 732, 219 N. Y. Supp. 449 (1926); Pratt v. Ladd, 253
N. Y. 213, 170 N. E. 895 (1930) ; Note (1930) 18 CAL. L. REV. 535.
33 Cf. United States Trust Co. v. Heye, supra note 32.
34 In re Osborne, supra note 1.
35 Bothwell v. Estep, 6 Pac. (2d) 1108 (Wash. 1932).
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each $100 par value share one share of no par value, with an
additional sum of $100, the cash being derived from the pro-
ceeds of the sale. The trustee in accordance with this plan re-
ceived 240 shares of no par stock and $24,000 in cash. On his
request for an instruction in regard to the cash item, the court
held that it constituted a return of capital, being in partial
liquidation of capital assets of the corporation. To the objection
of the life tenant that the subsidiary had been purchased with
accumulated earnings, the court replied,e "Directors, acting in
good faith, may retain a portion, or all, of the earnings of the
corporation which they control and thereby accumulate a surplus
to be invested and used in enlarging or expanding the corporate
business; and when so invested, the surplus becomes an integral
part of the capital assets of the corporation."
Although the result, thus achieved, if considered solely upon
the facts which appear in the majority opinion, would be justified
under the Pennsylvania rule on the ground that the earnings here
used to purchase the subsidiary were realized prior to the trust
date, the language quoted above goes beyond the Pennsylvania
rule in that it would also permit an award to corpus of the cor-
poration's earnings after the date of the trust on the ground of
their capitalization. It has already been pointed out that under
the Massachusetts decisions, earnings, irrespective of the time
when earned, do not ordinarily become capitalized to the extent
that dividends may not be allotted as income where the capital
of the corporation is not otherwise impaired3
The dissent seems to adopt the going-concern conception of the
Massachusetts court insofar as it emphasizes "I that there was
no allegation or proof that the parent corporation's capital had
been impaired by the payment of the dividend. Since the sale
price of the subsidiary, $4,700,000, was traceable to the extent
of $3,390,000 to undistributed earnings of the subsidiary during
the six years preceding the sale, the dissent would seem to be
supported by the Pennsylvania doctrine that any enhancement
in the value of corporate assets comprising the corpus at the
trust date, due to investment of subsequent earnings, constitutes
income in proportion to that investment. 19
It seems clear, therefore, that an application of the Massa-
chusetts rule would have resulted in an award of the entire
36 Id. at 1110.
37 Supra note 25.
38 Bothwell v. Estep, supra note 35, at 1111.
39 Supra note 19. Or it is possible to argue that since earnings of a
"wholly-owned" subsidiary constitute earnings of the parent corporation
itself (Macy v. Ladd, supra note 32) there was a distribution thereof to
the extent of $3,390,000.
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$24,000 to the life tenant. The Pennsylvania decisions would
seem to require the apportionment of approximately thirty-four
forty-sevenths ~~()oooo) of the amount to the life tenant.
ENFORCEMENT OF PROVISIONS IN hNSURANCE
POLICIES LIMITLG TIME WITHIN WHICH
ACTION MAY BE BROUGHT
WHEN insurance companies first introduced into their policies
the provision that any action upon a claim against the company
must be brought within a named period shorter than that allowed
by the statute of limitations, the objection was raised that the
contractual limitation was opposed to public policy.1 Although
the companies' plea that the limitation was necessary as a pro-
tection against fraudulently proved losses induced the courts to
affirm its validity,2 theories of "waiver" and "estoppel" 3 have
been utilized to avoid strict enforcement of the provision in the
many instances in which the insurer alone has been responsible
I Early cases, declaring the limitation invalid: French, Strong & Fine v.
Lafayette Insurance Co., 5 McLean 461 (C. C. D. Ind. 1853); Eagle In-
surance Co. v. Lafayette Insurance Co., 9 Ind. 443 (1857), overrulkd in
Insurance Co. of North America v. Brim, 111 Ind. 281, 12 N. E. 315 (18S7).
Early cases, declaring the limitation valid: Cray v. Hartford Fire In-
surance Co., 1 Blatch. 280 (C. C. D. Conn. 1848); Amesbury v. Bowditch
Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 6 Gray 596 (Mass. 1856) ; Williams v. Vermont
Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 20 Vt. 222 (1848); Ketchum v. Protection In-
surance Co., 1 Allen 136 (New Brunswick 1848).
2Riddlesbarger v. Hartford Insurance Co., 7 Wall. 386 (U. S. 180S);
Davidson v. Phoenix Insurance Co., 4 Sawy. 594 (C. C. N. D. Cal. 186);
Brown v. Savannah Mutual Insurance Co., 24 Ga. 97 (1858); Grant v.
Lex ngton Fire, Life & Marine Insurance Co., 5 Ind. 23 (1854); Peoria
Marine & Fire Insurance Co. v. Whitehill, 25 fI1. 466 (1861); Ripley v.
Aetna Insurance Co., 30 N. Y. *136 (1364); Portage County Mutual Fire
Insurance Co. v. West, 6 Ohio St. 599 (1856); North Western Insurance
Co. v. Phoenix Oil & Candle Co., 31 Pa. 44S (1858).
3 These terms are used whenever the courts deprive an insurance company
of the benefit of the policy's limitation clause, but with an unfortunate
failure to note the distinction between them. See Vance, Waivr and Es-
toppel in Insurance Law (1925) 34 YAn L. J. 834. Thus, in Dibbrell v.
Georgia Home Insurance Co., 110 N. C. 193, 211, 14 S. E. 783, 789 (1892),
it is said, "if the right to demand the forfeiture was waived at all, it was
because.. . the defendant was estopped by its conduct from enforcing that
clause of the contract." And in Harold v. People's Mutual Accident Insur-
ance Co., 2 Pa. Dist. 503, 505 (1892), where there were repeated and con-
tinued promises to pay, the court said that "this evidence shows an express
waiver, clinched by an estoppel." The difficulty, it would seem, is largely
due to the fact that very often the same sort of conduct that ordinarily is
said to raise an estoppel, may also be said to imply an "intent to relinquish"
the limitation and so to constitute a waiver.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
for the delay in suing.4
Such responsibility is sometimes traceable to a conflict of the
policy's time clauses. Insurance companies usually insert a pro-
vision to the effect that no right of action accrues until (usually)
sixty days after proof of loss,, and in some cases not until the
company has seen fit to act upon such proofs; 0 by the policy's
limitation clause, the action must be brought within a certain
time after the loss itself. Particularly if the limitation period is
a very short one, the assured's right of action may not accrue,
even with proofs prepared and submitted as quickly as possible,
before the end of the period within which suit may be brought.
When such a conflict of the policy's time clauses occurs, it would
seem unjust to enforce the limitation strictly. But while some
courts have so concluded, there is equal authority to the con-
trary.8
When a loss has occurred, the insurance company may cause
the assured to delay his action by failing to notify him that the
proofs he has submitted are insufficient or improper until shortly
before the expiration of the contract period. Thus, in one in-
stance a company demanded additional proofs requiring weeks
of preparation one month before the end of a year limitation
period., Under such circumstances, the courts may be expected
to hold that the action is not barred by the expiration of the
4 Thompson v. Phenix Insurance Co., 136 U. S. 287, 10 Sup, Ct. 1019
(1890); State Insurance Co. v. Maackens, 38 N. J. L. 564 (1876); Ames v.
N. Y. Union Insurance Co., 4 Kern. 253 (N. Y. 1856); Killips v. Putnam
Fire Insurance Co., 28 Wis. 472 (1871); see Peoria Marine & Fire Insur-
ance Co. v. Whitehill, supra note 2, at 475; VANCE, INSURANCE (2d ed, 1930)
795; 7 COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAWr (1930) § 1656.
5 See infra notes 7 and 8.
6 Stewart v. National Council of Knights and Ladies of Security, 125
Minn. 512, 147 N. W. 651 (1914); Dechter v. National Council of Knights
and Ladies of Security, 130 Minn. 329, 153 N. W. 742 (1915); of. Simmons
v. Western Indemnity Co., 210 S. W. 713 (Tex. 1919). But of. Fed. Life
Insurance Co. v. Holmes, 232 Ky. 834, 24 S. W. (2d) 906 (1930).
7 Illustrative cases are: Spare v. Home Mutual Insurance Co., 17 Fed.
568 (C. C. D. Ore. 1883); Friezen v. Allemania Fire Insurance Co., 30 Fed.
352 (C. C. D. Wis. 1887); Case v. Sun Insurance Co., 83 Cal. 473, 23 Pac.
534 (1890); Garretson v. Hawkeye Insurance Co., 65 Iowa 468, 21 N. W.
781 (1884); Ames v. N. Y. Union Insurance Co., supra note 4; Appel v.
Cooper Insurance Co., 76 Ohio St. 52, 80 N. E. 955 (1907); Pacific Mutual
Life Insurance Co. v. Adams, 27 Okla. 496, 112 Pac. 1026 (1910); Phoenix
Insurance Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 162 Tenn. 427, 37 S. W. (2d) 119
(1931); Kirk v. Firemen's Insurance Co., 107 W. Va. 666, 150 S. B. 2
(1929).
s Illustrative cases are: Chambers v. Atlas Insurance Co,, 51 Conn. 17
(1883); Johnson v. Humboldt Insurance Co., 91 Ill. 92 (1878); Dahroogo
v. Rochester German Insurance Co., 177 Mich. 442, 143 N. W. 608 (1913);
Egan v. Oakland Insurance Co., 29 Ore. "403, 42 Pac. 990 (1895) ; Hart v.
Citizens' Insurance Co., 86 Wis. 77, 56 N. W. 332 (1893).




After complete and satisfactory proofs of loss have been re-
ceived by the company, promptly or otherwise, further delay may
be occasioned by negotiations leading to an eventual denial or
admission of liability. The assured may claim and the company
deny that the loss was covered by the policy; 21 there may be
some uncertainty as to the performance of conditions precedent
by the assured; - or the parties may agree that a liability exists
but differ as to the amount. 3 Where such negotiations have con-
tinued longer than the contractual period, and finally are con-
cluded by the company's denial of liability, the limitation provi-
sion will not be enforced to bar suit by the assured.14
If the insurance company, either after prolonged negotiations
or immediately after loss has been proved, admits its liability
and promises to pay the sum due, the assured's action may still
be delayed an indefinite time. The company may later retract
its promise and deny liability; is or the promises may be repeated
for a long time until the assured, finally driven to disbelief,
decides to litigate his claim." The promise may be to pay at a
later time, coupled with a request for forbearance.2 There may
o10 Covenant Mutual Life Association v. Baughman, 73 Ii1. App. 544
(1897); Dolsen v. Phoenix Preferred Accident Insurance Co., 151 iich.
228, 115 N. W. 50 (1908); Higgins v. Fidelity-PhoenLx Fire Insurance Co.,
107 N. J. L. 175, 151 Atl. 869 (1930); Aktiebolaget Malareprovinsernas
Bank v. Hanover Fire Insurance Co., 211 App. Div. 608, 208 N. Y. Supp.
173 (1st Dep't 1925); Dibbrell v. Georgia Home Insurance Co., -upre
note 3; Killips v. Putnam Fire Insurance Co., supra note 4. Apparently
contra: Reynolds v. Detroit Fidelity & Surety Co., 19 F. (2d) 110 (C. C. A.
6th, 1927).
: Lynchburg Cotton Mill Co. v. Travelers' Insurance Co., 149 Fed. 954
(C. C. A. 4th, 1906); Syracuse Lighting Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co.,
226 N. Y. 25, 122 N. E. 723 (1919).
Thompson v. Phenix Insurance Co., supra note 4; Hay v. Bankers'
Life Co., 207 Mo. App. 277, 231 S. W. 1035 (1921).
13Allemania Fire Insurance Co. v. Peck, 133 Ill. 220, 24 N. E. 538 (1890);
Northwestern National Life Insurance Co. v. Ward, 56 Old. 188, 155 Pac.
524 (1915); David v. Oakland Home Insurance Co., 11 Wash. 181, 39 Pac.
443 (1895).
'14 See cases supra notes 11, 12, 13.
15 Kentucky Mutual Security Fund Co. v. Turner, 89 Ky. 665, 13 S. W.
104 (1890) ; Gilbert v. Globe & Rutgers Fire Insurance Co., 91 Ore. 59, 178
Pac. 358 (1919); Galloway v. Standard Fire Insurance Co., 45 W. Va. 237,
31 S. E. 969 (1898).
26 Stanley v. Sterling Mutual Life Insurance Co., 12 Ga. App. 475, 77
S. E. 664 (1913); Monahan v. Metropolitan Surety Co., 114 N. Y. Supp.
862 (1909); Harold v. People's Mutual Accident Insurance Co., stupra note
5; Horst v. City of London Fire Insurance Co., 73 Tex. 67, 11 S. W. 148
(1889) ; Black v. Winneshiek Insurance Co., 31 Wis. 74 (1872).
: American Insurance Co. v. McVickers Bros., 135 Ga. 118, 08 S. E. 1026
(1910); Illinois Live-stock Insurance Co. v. Baker, 153 Ill. 240, 38 N. E.
627 (1894); Continental Casualty Co. v. Hunt, 53 Ind. App. 657, 101
N. E. 519 (1913); Turner v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 112 Mich. 425, 70
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be an express agreement that all action be delayed for a specified
period.8 In none of these circumstances can the insurance com-
pany thereafter successfully contend that an action is barred by
the policy's limitation clause."'
In addition to the cases falling within these four groups, occa-
sional situations arise in which other factors delay the assured's
action. Should the company refuse settlement upon other grounds
and not mention that it intends to rely also upon the defense pro-
vided by the limitation clause, it will probably be held to have
deprived itself of that defense.20 In one instance the provision
was held inoperative because the company "wrongfully" retained
the policy returned to it with the proofs of loss, when the assured
did not know of the limitation -provision therein.2 1 And where
the suit was to enforce an arbitration award made in a manner
provided by the policy,22 or where extraneous factors such as
war 23 or a court injunction 24 delayed the assurfd's action, the
same result followed.
This friendliness to the assured's action will disappear if the
court is convinced that the delay has been occasioned not by the
company but by the carelessness of the assured himself. Thus
if no notice is given the company of the loss, or if no attempt is
made to submit proofs, until after the expiration of the contract
period, the limitation will bar the action.25 Or if all negotiations
and uncertainties were ended by a denial of liability a reasonable
time before the expiration of the policy's limitation period and
yet the assured delayed his action beyond the allotted time, the
N. W. 898 (1897); Waynesboro Mutual Fire Insurance Co., v. Conover, 98
Pa. 384 (1881); Staats v. Pioneer Insurance Association, 55 Wash. 51,
104 Pac. 185 (1909).
18 Philadelphia Casualty Co. v. Thacher, 236 Fed. 869 (C. C. A. 1st,
1916); Virginia Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Aiken, 82 Va. 424 (1886).
19 See cases supra notes 15, 16, 17, 18.
2o Hansell-Elcock Co. v. Frankfort Marine Accident & Plate Glass In-
surance Co., 177 Ill. App. 500 (1913); Hay v. Bankers' Life Co., supra
note 12; Bates v. German Commercial Accident Co., 87 Vt. 128, 88 Atl.
532 (1913).
21Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Stone, 41 Ga. App. 49, 152 S. E. 146
(1930).
22 Fellman v. Royal Insurance Co., 184 Fed. 577 (C. C. A. 5th, 1911);
Strampe v. Minnesota Farmers' Mutual Insurance Co., 109 Minn. 364, 123
N. W. 1083 (1909).
23 Semmes v. Hartford Insurance Co., 13 Wall. 158 (U. S. 1871).
24 Earnshaw v. Sun Mutual Aid Society, 68 lIfd. 465, 12 Atl. 884 (1888);
Scottish Union & National Insurance Co. v. Warren Gee Lumber Co., 118
Mi~s. 740, 80 So. 9 (1918).
21 Watson v. Mutual Life Insurance Co., 139 La. 737, 72 So. 189 (1916);
Sweetser v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 8 Misc. 251, 28 1X. Y. Supp.
543 (1894) ; Kelly v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 119 N. Y. Supp.
154 (App. Term 1909). Contra: Covenant Mutual Life Association v.




company may expect the limitation clause to be enforced.2 How-
ever, judicial antagonism to the limitation provision has proved
so strong that its value to insurance companies is becoming in-
creasingly doubtful.27
In some instances the insured has not brought suit after cessa-
tion of the insurer's misleading conduct for an additional period
of itself longer than the policy's original time limitation. The
further problem is then presented as to whether the contractual
limitation was only suspended during continuance of the delay-
ing conduct, beginning to run upon its termination and thus
barring the action, or was extinguished, permitting suit at any
time within the statutory period of limitation.
In those jurisdictions in which a provision that no right of
action accrues until a given time after proof of loss is considered
to conflict with the limitation clause,:2 it is held that the conflict
only suspends the running of the limitation period. - But where
the time at which the right of action accrues is dependent upon
the company's discretion as to when it shall act on proof of loss,
it appears that the limitation is totally extinguished and the full
26 Vincent v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Association, 74 Conn. 684; 51 Atl.
1066 (1902); Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Caudle, 122 Ga. 603, 50
S. E. 337 (1905); Dickirson v. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co., 319 Ill.
311, 150 N. E. 256 (1925); Blanks v. Hibernia Insurance Co., 36 La. Ann.
599 (1884); Betteys v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., 222 Mich. 626, 193 N. W.
197 (1923); Maynard v. U. S. Health & Accident Insurance Co., 76 N. H.
275, 81 Atl. 1077 (1911); Allen v. Dutchess County Mutual Insurance Co.,
95 App. Div. 86, 88 N. Y. Supp. 530 (2d Dep't 1904); Fey v. I. 0. 0. F.
Mutual Life Insurance Society, 120 Wis. 358, 98 N. W. 200 (1904); cf.
Friedberg v. Insurance Co. of North America, 241 N. W. 183 (Mich. 1932).
Contra: Steel v. Phenix Insurance Co., 51 Fed. 715 (C. C. A. 9th, 1892);
Voorheis v. People's Mutual Benefit Society, 91 Mich. 469, 51 N. W. 1109
(1892) ; Appel v. Cooper Insurance Co., gilpra note 7.
27 Illustrative of this antagonism is the changed view of the relation be-
tween the contractual limitation and that provided by statute. Several
decades after the courts had decided of such a provision that "so far from
interfering with, it more effectually secures the end sought to be attained
by the statute of limitations" (Ripley v. Aetna Insurance Co., stipra note
2, at "163), two state courts declared the contractual limitation to be void
as conflicting with the statute. Union Central Life Insurance Co. v. Spinks,
119 Ky. 261, 83 S. W. 615 (1904); Barnes v. McMurtry, 29 Neb. 178, 45
N. W. 285 (1890). Judicial antagonism to the provision has carried over
to the legislature, and in recent years many states have adopted statutes
which either declare void such limitations in insurance policies, or specify
a minimum time to which the assured may be limited. 5 JOYCE, INSUFULNCE
(2d ed. 1918) § 3224; 7 COUCH, op. cit. supra note 4, at § 1629.
28 See cases supra note 7.
29 Spare v. Home Mutual Insurance Co.; Friezen v. Allemania Fire Insur-
ance Co.; Case v. Sun Insurance Co.; Garretson v. Hawkeye Insurance Co.;
Ames v. N. Y. Union Insurance Co.; Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
Adams, all supra note 7. Contra: State Insurance Co. v. Maackens, 38 N.
J. L. (1876); see Appel v. Cooper Insurance Co., supra note 7, at 61, 80
N. E. at 958.
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statutory period is available for the assured's action.30
When the original delay in suing is due to the insurance com-
pany's misconduct subsequent to the loss, less certainty exists
as to how promptly after a denial of liability the assured must
bring his action. Some courts have held that the assured has, not
the contract period, but only a "reasonable" time after the de-
fendant company's denial of liability,31 but no attempt has been
made to justify or explain this rule. One court has computed the
limitation period from the time of loss, deducting therefrom a
short period during which the parties exchanged correspond-
ence . 2 Most of the few courts that have considered the question
have indicated that in such circumstances the limitation clause
is totally extinguished.33 The Supreme Court's decision in
Semmes v. Hartford Insurance Company,3" where diversity of
citizenship during the Civil War had delayed the assured's action,
is generally cited for this proposition.3 The precise question,
however, has received careful judicial consideration only in
Lynchburg Cotton Mill Co. v. Travelers' Insurance Company."
The court there argued that if mere suspension of the limitation
were to result, "no one would ever know when, as to such con-
tracts, 'the statute of limitations began or ceased to run. It
would not be determinable from an examination of the contract,
nor from the state statute, but would depend upon an uncertain
and indefinite state of facts." - In Gilbert v. Globe & Rutgers
Fire Insurance Company 3 it was held that suspension alone
would result when the company's misconduct delayed the as-
sured's action. The court decided that such misconduct raises an
estoppel rather than a waiver; and that, whereas a waiver would
3 0 Dechter v. National Council of Knights and Ladies of Security; Sim-
mons v. Western Indemnity Co., both supra note 6.
31 Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Adams, supra note 7; Staats V.
Pioneer Insurance Association, supra note 17.
32 Fey v. I. 0. 0. F. Mutual Life Insurance Society, supra note 26.
33Philadelphia Casualty Co. v. Thatcher, supra note 18; Galloway v.
Standard Fire Insurance Co., supra note 15; Friedberg v. Insurance Co. of
North America, supra note 26; cf. Scottish Union & National Insurance Co.
v. Warren Gee Lumber Co., supra note 24; Horst v. City of London Fire
Insurance Co., supra note 16; see Illinois Live-Stock Insurance Co. v. Baker,
supra note 17, at 242, 38 N. E. at 628; Strampe v. Minnesota Farmers'
Mutual Insurance Co., supra note 22, at 368, 123 N. W. at 1084; Dibbrell
v. Georgia Home Insurance Co., supra note 3, at 211, 14 S. E. at 789; State
Insurance Co. v. Maackens, supra note 4, at 572.
34 Supra note 23. Followed in Earnshaw v. Sun Mutual Aid Society, supra
note 24.
sr The peculiar circumstances of Semmes v. Hartford Insurance Co., how-
ever, render the case easily distinguishable. See Gilbert v. Globe & Rutgers
Fire Insurance Co., supra note 15.
30 Supra note 11.
37 Id. at 956.
38 Supra note 15.
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extinguish the limitation, "The ban of an estoppel may be lifted
by the party against whom it is invoked" 20 by cessation of the
improper conduct.0 However, the existing confusion as to what
sorts of conduct will be interpreted as raising an estoppel rather
than implying a waiver, constitutes a major difficulty in the ap-
plication of this rule.4
The result of the Gilbert case, that the limitation is only sus-
pended, seems the most reasonable. While it does not charge the
assured with delays for which he is not responsible, it carries
out the purpose of the provision in limiting the period within
which action may be brought.2 However, the antagonism with
which anything related to the limitation provision is viewed is
apparently leading to a wider acceptance of the stricter rule, that
the limitation is totally extinguished.
39 Id. at 67, 178 Pac. at 358.
40 For a vigorous denial of this theory see Dibbrell v. Georgia Home In-
surance Co., supra note 3, at 211, 14 S. E. at 789.
See supra note 3.
42In accord with the Gilbert case: Killips v. Putnam Fire Ins. Co., &,tp;'a
note 4; cf. Kentucky Mutual Security Fund Co. v. Turner, supra note 15;
Virginia Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Aiken, supra note 18; see Appel v.
Cooper Ins. Co., supra note 7, at 61, 80 N. E. at 958.
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